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NOTE
WHO PROTECTS WHOM: FEDERAL
LAW AS A FLOOR, NOT A CEILING,
TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM
INAPPROPRIATE USE OF FORCE
BY SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS
ELSA HAAG*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past forty years, students in the U.S. have experienced
increasingly strict school discipline policies and increased police
presence in schools. The proportion of U.S. schools patrolled by police
increased from about 1 percent in 1975 to nearly 50 percent in 2017.1
Legislators and policy makers have sent police, often called “school
resource officers” (SROs), into schools to improve security in the wake
of mass shootings. But research has repeatedly shown that this policy
has not produced the desired effect: There is limited evidence that such
programs increase school safety,2 and the regular presence of law
Copyright 2021 © Elsa Haag.
* J.D., Duke Law School, Class of 2021. Special thanks to the ACLU Disability Rights Program
for reinforcing my interest in this topic and providing valuable feedback. Thanks also to Crystal
Grant, Peggy Nicholson, Harold Jordan, Sabrina Bernadel, T.W., and S.S. for sharing their time
and expertise with me; Professor Miller for his guidance in developing this Note and for
introducing me to the idea of lockstepping; and my fellow editors on the Duke Journal of
Constitutional Law & Public Policy for their thoughtful feedback and edits.
1. AM. C.L. UNION, Cops and No Counselors: How the Lack of School Mental Health Staff
Is Harming Students 4, 8 (2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/030419acluschooldisciplinereport.pdf [hereinafter Cops and No Counselors].
2. See John Woodrow Cox & Steven Rich, Scarred by School Shootings: More Than
187,000 Students Have Been Exposed to Gun Violence at School Since Columbine, WASH. POST
(Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/us-school-shootingshistory/ (describing a study finding that, between 1999 and 2018, out of 197 gunfire incidents at
school, there was one instance where a school resource officer stopped an active shooter by
returning fire); Denise C. Gottfredson et al., Effects of School Resource Officers on School Crime
and Responses to School Crime, 19 CRIMINOLOGY PUB. POL’Y 905, 931 (2020) (finding that there
is no empirical support for the popular belief that deployment of SROs “will prevent mass
shootings from occurring”). See also CONG. RES. SERV. R45251, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS:
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enforcement in schools negatively impacts students in a myriad of
ways,3 including by causing physical and emotional harm and worse
educational outcomes (e.g., contributing to the “school-to-prison
pipeline”).4 These injuries are borne disproportionately by students of
color and disabled students.5
Proponents of SROs often emphasize SROs’ additional roles as
counselors, educators, and mentors. As the Executive Director of the
National Association of School Resource Officers explained, “[w]elltrained school resource officers operate more like counselors and
educators, . . . working with students to defuse peer conflict and address
issues such as drug and alcohol use.”6 In response to calls to reallocate
SRO funding to programs that support students’ mental, social, and
emotional well-being, one police department emphasized that SROs
serve as “an ear that will listen, a coach, a mentor, an educator, a trusted
adult, a counselor, a service provider, a facilitator of resources. . . . The
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
1,
6–12
(2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20180705_R45251_db5492370a04c7e3b39f27ce52416d229a
0ac17d.pdf (summarizing data from various studies on the efficacy and impact of SROs).
3. See, e.g., Emily K. Weisburst, Patrolling Public Schools: The Impact of Funding for
School Police on Student Discipline and Long-Term Education Outcomes, 38 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 338, 362 (2019) (“On the whole, the results suggest that SROs have the potential to
negatively affect students, through both increasing student discipline involvement and reducing
student educational attainment.”).
4. See, e.g., Jennifer Counts et al., School Resource Officers in Public Schools: A National
Review, 41 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 405, 426 (2018) (citation omitted) (“Greater numbers
of school arrests for school behavior/conduct violations, rather than criminal activity, have
exposed students to adjudication through the school-to-prison pipeline.”); Gottfredson et al.,
supra note 2, at 909 (describing studies “support[ing] the conclusion that SROs, by increasing
exclusionary responses to school discipline incidents, increase the criminalization of school
discipline and in so doing contribute to a ‘school to prison pipeline,’ which disproportionately
affects minority youth and students with disabilities and increases the likelihood that minority
youth will end up in prison”).
5. See Counts et al., supra note 4, at 426 (citation omitted) (“Particularly impacted by these
practices are at-risk groups who are already disproportionately affected in exclusionary discipline
(e.g. special education and minority students).”). There is disagreement over using “person-first”
language, i.e., a person with a disability, or “identity-first” language, i.e., a disabled person. This
note will primarily use identity-first language because it is the language that many disabled people
prefer. See, e.g., Emily Ladau, Why Person-First Language Doesn’t Always Put the Person First,
THINK INCLUSIVE (July 20, 2015) https://www.thinkinclusive.us/why-person-first-languagedoesnt-always-put-the-person-first/ (describing the debate, its origins, and conventions around
usage). In some instances, this note will alternate or use person-first language when, for example,
that is the language used in a statute. In addition, a precise definition of disability is not needed
for this note. However, the Note’s use of the term will mostly align with statutory definitions of
disability that are relevant in school settings.
6. Dana Goldstein, Do Police Officers Make Schools Safer or More Dangerous?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/us/schools-police-resourceofficers.html (quoted language from article paraphrasing original statement of the Executive
Director of the National Association of School Resource Officers).
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law enforcement aspect of being an SRO is very minimal.”7
Ultimately, though, even if SROs assume the role of counselor and
educator, they retain the immense power and privileges of sworn law
enforcement officers. They are exempt from many restrictions that
apply to teachers, school administrators, and counselors, but are
equipped with handcuffs, tasers, and other methods of control.
Meanwhile, most schools in the U.S. have far fewer school counselors,
social workers, nurses, and psychologists than recommended,8 and
millions of students are educated in schools with police present but no
counselor, nurse, psychologist, or social worker.9 “Conflating the law
enforcement purpose of school police with ‘educators’, ‘counselors’ and
‘social workers’ is both misleading and dangerous,” in part because it
“justifies the under-investment in funding, hiring and training of social
and emotional supports for students to fulfill these roles.”10
Despite years of work by advocates to prevent the physical,
emotional, and social injuries caused by SROs, these harms continue to
occur. And aside from the most extreme situations, the Constitution
and federal law are inadequate both for preventing SROs from using
inappropriate force and for providing relief when harm has already
occurred. In any event, claims against SROs rely heavily on federal
law.11 While there is extensive research and legal scholarship about
SROs and related issues, there is minimal legal scholarship on areas
where state constitutions and state law may offer additional
mechanisms for advocates working to protect students with disabilities

7. Jimmy Bentley, Ban Police Officers from MA Schools: Teachers Union, PATCH
(Jun 22, 2020), https://patch.com/massachusetts/barnstable-hyannis/ma-teachers-associationcalls-end-police-presence-schools (reporting on statement saying, “Districts must change how
they meet the emotional health and safety needs of students and identify and obtain the necessary
resources to keep students, educators and communities safe”).
8. Cops and No Counselors, supra note 1, at 4–5 (explaining that 90% of public schools fail
to meet professional recommendations).
9. Id. at 4 (“14 million students are in schools with police but no counselor, nurse,
psychologist, or social worker. 1.7 million students are in schools with police but no counselors; 3
million students are in schools with police but no nurses; 6 million students are in schools with
police but no school psychologists; and 10 million students are in schools with police but no social
workers.”).
10. Fail: School Policing in Massachusetts, CITIZENS FOR JUV. JUST. & STRATEGIES FOR
YOUTH
17
(2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ea378e414fb5fae5ba06c7/t/5f64b57d40e1a14ef6c1c468/16
00435601167/SchoolSafetyPolicyReport.pdf [hereinafter School Policing in Mass. Report].
11. See Perry A. Zirkel, An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law Arising from the Use of
School Resource Officers, 48 J.L. & EDUC. 305, 317 (2019) (finding that approximately 70% of
student-specific claim rulings in SRO-related cases were based on federal constitutional or
legislative claims).
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from inappropriate actions by SROs.12
States often have the authority and latitude to impose more robust
protections,13 especially in the arenas of education and law
enforcement, which are traditionally areas of state and local control.14
Yet state constitutional provisions, laws, and regulations—and courts’
interpretations of those requirements—tend to mirror federal analogs
in a phenomenon called “lockstepping” or “judicial federalism.”15 This
Note examines whether there are state law mechanisms that are more
protective of disabled students than federal laws, and whether such laws
provide an additional avenue either for relief after harm has occurred
or to prevent such harms altogether. However, even where state
provisions may provide relief, broader harm prevention will require
comprehensive federal and state policy reform. States and localities
can—and should—implement reforms and treat federal law as a floor
rather than as a ceiling, and state courts should avoid reflexive
lockstepping when interpreting state provisions.
This Note begins by describing the role of SROs and presenting
research on their efficacy and impact. Part II describes litigation trends,
limits on SRO actions under federal law, and the potential for broader
use of state law for curtailing inappropriate SRO conduct. Part III
canvasses SRO, school discipline, and disability discrimination laws in
Massachusetts and analyzes potential claims under select provisions in
comparison to federal law to provide a roadmap for such legal analysis.
Part IV draws on perspectives from advocates at non-profit litigation
and policy organizations to describe key areas for reform and
conclusions regarding potential legal strategies that may be available

12. Prior research and scholarship have examined, among many other topics, the types of
federal claims available to students after incidents with SROs and the impacts of SROs and zerotolerance discipline on educational and other outcomes. Many organizations have also prepared
compendiums of state laws and requirements related to use of corporal punishment, restraint and
seclusion, and SRO training requirements.
13. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A
Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2017) (“Many state constitutions also have provisions
that mandate government provision of social services, such as education and welfare, and state
courts have held that these provisions confer positive rights that the Supreme Court has refused
to recognize under the Federal Constitution.”).
14. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
2 (8th ed. 2016) (“[M]ost public services that affect people in their homes and families—public
schools, policing . . ., public safety. . .—are provided by states and localities, not the federal
government.”).
15. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
323, 325 (2011). Lockstepping is typically used to describe constitutional law, but this Note will
apply the concept to include statutes and regulations.
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under state law.
I. THE RISE OF SROS AND PUNITIVE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTS
School resource officers (SROs) are sworn law enforcement
officers with arrest authority that are assigned to work in one or more
schools.16 They are usually employed by a local law enforcement agency,
like a county or city police department.17 SROs are distinct from
security guards who lack arrest authority.18 The purpose of SROs is
usually to “ensure the safety and security of students, faculty, staff, and
visitors.”19 The membership organization for SROs developed the
“triad model,” in which the SRO’s role includes duties as a law
enforcement officer, an informal counselor, and a teacher.20 But in
reality, studies show that SROs spend most of their time on law
enforcement activities.21
This section will first describe the SRO role, drivers behind the
increased prevalence of SROs, and the relationship between SRO
presence and stricter discipline practices generally. Second, this section
will summarize data on the impacts of SROs.
A. SROs and “zero tolerance” discipline policies
Use of SROs grew significantly beginning in the 1990s and early
2000s, coinciding with highly publicized school shootings and the
passage of federal legislation funding SRO programs.22 The growth was
16. CONG. RES. SERV. R45251, supra note 2, at 2.
17. Id. In some cities, the school district has its own school police department that is separate
from the city police department or sheriff’s office. Id. (“The difference between SROs and school
police officers is that the latter are employed by a school police department (e.g., the Los Angeles
School Police Department) and not a city police department or sheriff’s office.”). For the
purposes of this Note, the term SRO will generally include school police officers.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Mo Canady et al., To Protect and Educate: The School Resource Officer and the
Prevention of Violence in Schools, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS 21 (2012),
https://www.nasro.org/clientuploads/resources/NASRO-Protect-and-Educate.pdf.
See
also
CONG. RES. SERV. R45251, supra note 2, at 1 (“[T]hese officers are more than armed sentries
waiting to engage a shooter. . . [T]heir roles can be placed into three general categories: (1) safety
expert and law enforcer, (2) problem solver and liaison to community resources, and (3)
educator.”).
21. Elizabeth A. Shaver & Janet R. Decker, Handcuffing a Third Grader: Interactions
Between School Resource Officers and Students with Disabilities, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 229, 235–36
(2017) (collecting studies on SRO roles) (“[T]he law enforcement aspect of the triad model seems
to be predominant in the everyday work of SROs.”).
22. See Weisburst, supra note 3, at 341 (“Political interest in school police escalated after
the high-profile Columbine school shooting in 1999.”). See also Kerrin C. Wolf, Assessing
Students’ Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource Officers, 38 PACE L. REV. 215, 222 (2018)
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largely driven by hopes that the presence of SROs would keep students
safe. In 1999, the DOJ created the “COPS in Schools” grant program to
support law enforcement in schools.23 Political support and federal and
state funding for SROs has fluctuated since the 1990s,24 but on the
whole, federal, state, and local governments tend to increase funding
for SROs after mass school shootings.25 For example, after the 2018
shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland,
Florida, states spent millions on security upgrades and SROs.26 In
conjunction with adding SROs, schools across the U.S. have adopted
increasingly strict disciplinary policies.27 Federal funding has
incentivized schools to adopt “zero tolerance” policies for offenses
related to weapons and drugs, and states and school districts have
expanded the scope of zero tolerance policies to apply to an array of
less serious conduct.28
Despite the federal incentives for states to use SROs, there are no
federal training or supervision requirements, and training and
qualification requirements vary widely across states.29 As of 2016, fewer
than half of all states had statutes or regulations that set minimum
qualifications for SROs, and only a few states described the training

(describing legislation that promoted the use of SROs, including the Violent Crime and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act).
23. Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 233.
24. See Weisburst, supra note 3, at 342 (describing fluctuating appropriations and attitudes
from the Bush administration to present); Gottfredson et al., supra note 2, at 908 (“As federal
funding for SROs has become less certain, state level funding has increased.”).
25. See, e.g., Department of Justice Awards Hiring Grants for Law Enforcement and School
Safety Officers, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departmentjustice-awards-hiring-grants-law-enforcement-and-school-safety-officers (reporting an allocation
of $45 million to the COPS program to fund 356 new SRO positions following the mass shooting
at Sandy Hook Elementary School).
26. Carolyn Phenicie, The State of School Security Spending: Here’s How States Have
Poured $900 Million into Student Safety Since the Parkland Shooting, THE 74 (August 20, 2018),
https://www.the74million.org/article/the-state-of-school-security-spending-heres-how-stateshave-poured-900-million-into-student-safety-since-the-parkland-shooting/
(“The
amounts
ranged widely by state, from $300,000 in Missouri to $400 million in Florida. They include only
what’s being spent [in 2018], though some states allocated a larger amount over a few years.”).
27. Wolf, supra note 22, at 222–23.
28. Id. at 223. See also Weisburst, supra note 3, at 341 n.6 (explaining that zero-tolerance
policies are “laws or school policies that require predetermined consequences for specific student
offenses, without considering mitigating circumstances or context”).
29. Counts et al., supra note 4, at 412 (“Although SROs are one of the fastest growing
branches of policing, there are no federal guidelines outlining the procedures for training
SROs.”); Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 236–42 (describing National Association of School
Resource Officer training courses, state training statutes and regulations, and SRO training on
mental health and issues affecting students with disabilities).
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SROs should receive.30 Some state statutes include precatory language
or discretionary requirements for SRO training on youth mental and
behavioral health issues and interacting with disabled students.31
Increasingly, states and localities have imposed limits on SRO
discretion32 and have suggested or required that school districts create
written memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the local law
enforcement agency supplying SROs to delineate SROs’ duties and
decision-making authority.33
B. The Impacts of SROs
There is minimal evidence to suggest that SROs improve school
safety.34 To the contrary, research shows that SROs have a largely
negative impact on students, inflicting physical and emotional harm,
increasing students’ interactions with the criminal justice system for
minor misbehavior, diminishing students’ experience of a positive, safe
school environment, and inhibiting educational attainment and
outcomes.35 Studies have found that increased reliance on surveillance
and unreasonable searches and seizures may create, among other
things, “an environment of fear and distrust, reduce perceived
30. See Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 238 (“Twenty-three states and the District of
Columbia have state statutes or regulations that require SROs to be trained or certified. However,
most states do not specify curriculum or training guidelines, although some state administrative
agencies or organizations may be responsible for developing training material or curricula.”).
31. Id. at 240.
32. Gottfredson et al., supra note 2, at 907 (describing concerns that have been raised about
SROs and that “many school districts have recently begun to place limits on SRO discretion”).
33. See Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 243 n.107 (collecting state MOU statutes). See
also OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
FACT
SHEET
1,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.
(2017),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2017AwardDocs/chp/MOU_Fact_Sheet.pdf (“Every jurisdiction with
a school and law enforcement partnership should have an MOU that clearly defines the roles and
responsibilities of the individual partners involved, including school districts, boards or
departments of education, school administration officials, law enforcement agencies (including
SROs), students, and parents.”). For an extensive collection and comparison of state SRO and
discipline laws and regulations, see Compendium of School Discipline Laws and Regulations for
the 50 States, Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Territories, NAT’L CTR. ON SAFE SUPPORTIVE
LEARNING ENV’TS, https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/school-discipline-compendium (last
visited Feb. 3, 2021).
34. See, e.g., Gottfredson et al. supra note 2, at 908–13, 929–31 (providing a literature review
of research on SROs, noting that there is no empirical support for the popular belief that
deployment of SROs prevents mass shootings, and finding that increased SRO presence does not
reduce school crime).
35. Weisburst, supra note 3, at 339–41 (providing a literature review of research on the
impact of SROs and discipline measures and analyzing data from Texas schools). See also School
Policing in Mass. Report, supra note 10, at 14 (noting a study which found that “being stopped at
school by police officers was a ‘potent’ predictor of heightened emotional distress and
posttraumatic stress symptoms in youth.”).
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legitimacy of police, weaken the school’s sense of community, and
diminish students’ willingness to confide in school staff when they are
experiencing problems.”36 As one judge noted, the use of handcuffs can
disrupt a child’s education “far beyond the time they actually spend in
handcuffs” by causing children to have negative feelings about school,
stigmatizing and alienating them, and making them not want to
attend.37 Other studies have identified similar findings and have linked
federal grants for SROs to both an increase in discipline rates and a
decrease in high school graduation rates.38
With more SROs in schools, there has also been a dramatic increase
in escalating interactions between SROs and students. Arrests by SROs
and other police officers called to schools are overwhelmingly for
minor misbehavior39 “once considered to be under the purview of
school administrative discipline.”40 Common student behaviors can
result in serious, disproportionate criminal charges: for instance, fake
burping resulted in criminal charges for “disrupting school”; refusing
to leave the lunchroom and cursing led to charges of disorderly
conduct; throwing a paper airplane and a baby carrot led to assault
charges; and the temper tantrum of a five year-old with ADHD was
met with charges for battery of a police officer.41
As trained law enforcement officers, SROs tend to use “justice
system responses” to address student misbehavior when the behavior
could be addressed without escalating to such extremes.42 In a case
involving an SRO in the Fourth Circuit, Chief Judge Roger Gregory
described the harms from this kind of school policing: “Unnecessarily
handcuffing and criminally punishing young schoolchildren is
undoubtedly humiliating, scarring, and emotionally damaging. We must
be mindful of the long-lasting impact such actions have on these

36. Gottfredson et al. supra note 2, at 928.
37. E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2018).
38. See Weisburst, supra note 3, at 339–41 (providing an extensive literature review of
research on the impacts of SROs and original quantitative research). But see Gottfredson et al.,
supra note 2, at 929 (noting that the increased school disciplinary offenses in their study are
“probably due at least in part to increased surveillance”).
39. Wolf, supra note 22, at 224–25.
40. Counts et al., supra note 4, at 426 (“Increases in the number of school arrests for
behaviors that were once considered to be under the purview of school administrative discipline
have amplified the likelihood that students will experience exclusionary discipline
consequences.”).
41. Cops and No Counselors, supra note 1, at app. D tbl.A7 (citing various news articles
describing incidents).
42. Wolf, supra note 22, at 252.
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children and their ability to flourish and lead prosperous lives . . . .”43
Students with disabilities and students of color experience the
negative impacts of such responses most acutely. Many of the SRO and
student interactions that escalate involve disabled students and often
occur in connection with behavior related to the student’s disability.
Indeed, students with disabilities are nearly three times more likely to
be arrested than their nondisabled counterparts, and in some states,
arrest was ten times more likely.44 While there is minimal data
specifically on arrests of disabled students by SROs, “there are an
increasing number of reported cases where students with disabilities
have been handcuffed or arrested by SROs.”45 Disabled students
account for 16 percent of the U.S. student population,46 but nearly 80
percent of students subjected to restraint or seclusion (by SROs and
other school personnel) were disabled students.47 More broadly,
disabled students are disciplined more than their non-disabled peers,
including with restraints, suspensions, expulsions, arrests, and referrals
to the criminal justice system.48
Cumulatively, the presence of SROs denies students the

43. E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 188 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[O]fficers should not
handcuff young students who may have committed minor offenses but do not pose an immediate
threat to safety and will not evade arrest.”).
44. Cops and No Counselors, supra note 1, at 5 (summarizing data collected by the
Department of Education and other sources, and finding that “Black and Latino boys with
disabilities were 3 percent of students but were 12 percent of school arrests”).
45. Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 248 (citation omitted).
46. U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. FOR C.R., 2017-2018 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: THE
USE OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION ON CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN K-12 SCHOOLS, 2
(2020), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/restraint-and-seclusion.pdf (including
students served under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504)).
47. Id. at 6–7. Students who are Black and disabled were subjected to particularly
disproportionate rates of restraint and seclusion. See id. at 10–11 (reporting that students who are
Black account for 18 percent of students served under the IDEA, yet account for 26 percent of
disabled students subjected to physical restraint; 34 percent of disabled students subjected to
mechanical restraint; and 22 percent of disabled students subjected to seclusion). But see U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-20-345, K-12 EDUCATION NEEDS TO ADDRESS
SIGNIFICANT QUALITY ISSUES WITH ITS RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION DATA 1, (April 2020)
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/706269.pdf (stating that restraint and seclusion data is almost
certainly underinclusive).
48. Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 247. See Counts et al., supra note 4, at 426 (cleaned
up) (“Greater numbers of school arrests for school behavior/conduct violations, rather than
criminal activity, have exposed students to adjudication through the school-to-prison pipeline.
This is despite the lack of research demonstrating the efficacy of exclusionary discipline practices,
zero tolerance policies, and adjudication of student behaviors for improving school safety.
Particularly impacted by these practices are at-risk groups who are already disproportionately
affected in exclusionary discipline (e.g., special education and minority students).”).
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opportunity to learn.49 These SRO interactions and negative outcomes
fall disproportionately on students with disabilities and students of
color, adding to the already staggering educational and societal barriers
that these students face.
II. LEGAL STRATEGIES TO OBTAIN RELIEF FOR INJURIES FROM
SROS HAVE FALLEN SHORT
With increasing presence of SROs in schools, students have sought
relief in the courts, albeit with minimal success.50 Lawsuits brought in
response to SRO actions generally raise federal constitutional and
statutory claims against school districts, police departments, and
individual police officers. Students often sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,51
claiming they have been subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment or to a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process violation.52 Disabled students also bring suits
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),53 Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504),54 and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).55 Students’ claims typically fall into
two categories—education-based claims related to the IDEA, and
arrest-based claims related to the ADA and Section 504. In some cases,
students raise violations of state tort laws, state anti-discrimination
statutes, or state constitutional law as well.56
Federal law imposes some limits on SROs, but rulings on federal
claims largely favor law enforcement, the school district, or other

49. See generally We Came to Learn: A Call to Action for Police-Free Schools,
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST. (2018), https://advancementproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/WCTLweb/index.html#page=1 (describing the impacts of exclusionary policies).
50. See Zirkel, supra note 11, at 314–22 (providing an overview of a study finding that most
federal claim rulings in cases involving SROs were resolved in favor of the government authority);
Wolf, supra note 22, at 219 (concluding that “students’ potential civil rights remedies against
abuses by SROs are quite limited because of the considerable leeway provided to SROs in their
interactions with students by existing student rights jurisprudence”).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. . . .”).
52. Wolf, supra note 22, at 240.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
55. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.
56. Zirkel, supra note 11, at 317 tbl.2.
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government authority.57 A 2019 study found that just six percent of
federal claim rulings came down in favor of the individual student,
while the rest were in favor of the government authority (75 percent),
or were inconclusive (19 percent).58 Even so, litigants rely heavily on
federal law: Among final decisions on the merits in cases involving
students and SROs, nearly 70 percent of the claims ruled upon were
based on a federal law, including the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, and the ADA, Section 504, and the IDEA.59
This section will describe limits on SROs under some of the most
frequently litigated federal laws and highlight some of the reasons that
outcomes for federal claims typically favor government authorities. In
light of broad reliance on federal law claims in SRO-related litigation
and the poor outcomes for individual students, this section will then
consider the practice of states interpreting their constitutions in
lockstep with the U.S. Constitution and the potential for broader
protections under state law.
A. Federal limits on SRO actions under the Fourth Amendment and
disability discrimination statutes
1. Section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment
Students in SRO-related cases often bring claims for wrongful
seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.60
SRO-related Fourth Amendment claims are typically raised under 42
57. Id.
58. See id. (providing separate totals for claims under federal statutes and the Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments). Inconclusive rulings included denials of pretrial motions, e.g.,
dismissal or summary judgment; government authorities included school districts, the city or
county employing an SRO, or the state. Id. at 314. The study identified 229 student-specific
rulings: 157 were on federal claims. Id. at 317. Student-specific claim rulings included civil cases
where a student was the plaintiff and criminal cases where the student was the defendant and
excluded rulings where the SRO or another non-student was the plaintiff, e.g., another school
employee or the parents separate from the student. Id. at 316.
59. Id. at 317 (finding that of student-specific claim rulings, approximately 40% were based
on the Fourth Amendment; 13% on the Fifth Amendment; 11% on the Fourteenth Amendment;
7% on federal legislation; 15% on state torts; 18% on criminal codes; and only .9% (two claim
rulings) on state constitutions).
60. Id. at 318. The presence of SROs in schools also frequently raises issues related to
protection against unreasonable searches, in part because of blurred lines between the SRO’s role
as a member of law enforcement and as school personnel. Issues related to this blurring of roles
are also relevant to seizure analysis. See generally Peter Price, When is a Police Officer an Officer
of the Law: The Status of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541 (2009)
(evaluating the evidentiary standards that courts apply in cases involving SROs, considering
challenges with and confusion on the role of police in schools, and advocating for a bright line
rule that treats SROs as police officers at all times).
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U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private right of action to individuals
when a public official “acting under color of state law” violates a
codified legal right.61 The case law in this area tends to favor law
enforcement and other government authorities, making it difficult for
students injured by SROs to succeed in court.62
These outcomes largely demonstrate the nearly impenetrable veil
of qualified immunity.63 Qualified immunity shields state and local
governments and officials from the burdens of suit altogether, and, by
extension, from paying civil damages.64 Traditionally, courts have
justified qualified immunity based on “the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.”65 Qualified immunity has evolved into a potent defense
for law enforcement in many settings, but it has proven a particularly
powerful roadblock in SRO cases because of the relative newness of
widespread use of SROs.
Qualified immunity applies unless a court concludes that the
government or official violated “clearly established law.” To succeed
on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) a right was violated,
and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the
official’s actions such that the official would have sufficient notice that
their actions would violate the right.66 Courts “define the ‘clearly
61. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (The “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken under color of state law.”) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941)). A state official acting under a “badge of authority” can be liable even if their actions
violated restrictions on that authority. Id. at 171–72 (“ . . . Congress has the power to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State
and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse
it.”). Requirements for municipal liability differ from those for state liability. Municipalities are
immune from liability unless the plaintiff can establish that the official was acting under an official
policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[A] local government
may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it
is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”).
62. See Wolf, supra note 22, at 219 (noting that students’ federal civil rights remedies against
SROs are “quite limited” because of the qualified immunity defense and “because applicable laws
and school rules are particularly controlling of student behavior, SROs can more readily justify
their more aggressive and antagonistic interactions with students”).
63. Id.
64. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (noting that “qualified immunity
protects government officials from liability for civil damages” and is “an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability”) (cleaned up).
65. Id.
66. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 202 (2001) (establishing a two-part test for
qualified immunity and holding that “[i]f the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct
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established’ right at issue on the basis of the ‘specific context of the
case,’” and earlier precedents must closely resemble the fact patterns
and claims of the current litigation.67 If the right was clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation, the official is likely not entitled to
qualified immunity.68 However, courts frequently decide § 1983 cases
without addressing whether the conduct violated the law because they
have discretion to determine the order for addressing each prong of the
two-prong test.69 This makes it nearly impossible for rights to become
clearly established in the first place. In the SRO context, it is
particularly difficult for law to become clearly established because
“existing case law [about SROs] is inconsistent and favorable to SROs’
ability to search students based on minimal information and use force
against students even if they seemingly do not pose a real threat.”70
The Fourth Amendment use of force standard also gives law
enforcement significant latitude and deference: Courts have recognized
a need for officers to make split-second decisions under exigent
circumstances.71 There are two different tests that courts apply in the
school setting to evaluate the objective reasonableness of seizures and
use of force: the test from New Jersey v. T. L. O.,72 and the “Graham
factors” from Graham v. Connor.73 The T. L. O. test is two-fold: The
would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”).
67. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
But see Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Even in the
absence of factually similar case law, an official can have fair warning that his conduct is
unconstitutional when the constitutional violation is obvious, sometimes referred to as ‘obvious
clarity’ cases.”).
68. See, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (“[Q]ualified immunity protects government
officials . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (cleaned up)).
69. See id. at 236 (modifying the two-part test from Saucier and holding that lower courts
“should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.”). Put another way, by allowing courts to first determine if “the right that was
allegedly violated was clearly established,” courts can avoid determining “if a right was in fact
violated in the case at hand.” Wolf, supra note 22, at 239.
70. Wolf, supra note 22, at 254–55. See also generally Kevin P. Brady, School Resource
Officers and the Unsettled Legal Standard for Establishing Student Excessive Force Claims, 359
EDUC. L. REP. 689 (2018) (describing why the law on SROs is unclear and providing an overview
of key Supreme Court cases and varied state laws on SROs).
71. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”).
72. See 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985) (“[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”).
73. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96 (considering “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
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court considers whether the search was “justified at its inception” and
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.”74 The Graham factors evaluate the
severity of the crime, the immediacy of any safety threats to officers or
others, and whether the individual is “actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest.”75 Courts can also consider other factors,76
and in SRO-related cases, those factors may include the school setting
and the relative threat in light of the student’s age.77 But generally,
“students’ youth (and their diminished physical prowess) do not seem
to restrict SRO’s ability to use force when arresting students for even
the most minor misbehavior.”78 As described above, establishing that
an SRO violated a Fourth Amendment right is often not enough to
prevail because the law governing SROs is so unsettled. Taken together,
the strength of the qualified immunity defense and the unsettled state
of law governing SROs mean that recovery is rare.79
2. Disability discrimination statutes: The ADA, Section 504, and
the IDEA
Public school students with disabilities are protected primarily by
three laws: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),80
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”). Circuits are divided on which standard
to apply, and some courts apply both. See, e.g., K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Sch., 931 F.3d 813, 822
(8th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases and summarizing the split “on whether to apply T.L.O.’s
reasonableness standard or the objective reasonableness standard set forth in Graham . . . to law
enforcement seizures of students” and noting that “[s]ome courts have opted to apply both . . . in
analyzing a claim of unreasonable seizure and excessive force”) (citations omitted).
74. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
75. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96.
76. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (noting that analysis of
objective reasonableness is highly fact specific and providing non-exclusive examples illustrating
the types of “objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force”).
77. See, e.g., E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting, in a case
where an SRO handcuffed a calm, compliant ten-year-old, that “we believe it prudent to consider
also the suspect’s age and the school context”); S.R. v. Kenton Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 302 F. Supp.
3d 821, 833 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (considering the nature of plaintiffs’ conduct, which “[did] not call to
mind the type of ‘assault’ which would warrant criminal prosecution,” the lack of immediate
threat posed by the children given their respective ages and statures, and the method of
handcuffing).
78. Wolf, supra note 22, at 219, 254.
79. See, e.g., E.W., 884 F.3d at 186–87 (concluding that an SRO’s seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment under the Graham factors, but holding that the SRO was entitled to qualified
immunity because it was not clearly established that handcuffing a non-threatening child could
violate the Fourth Amendment); S.R., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 834–35 (applying both Graham and
T.L.O. and concluding that the SRO violated the Fourth Amendment, but dismissing the claim
because the SRO was entitled to qualified immunity).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504),81 and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).82 With SROs’
ubiquitous presence in schools, it is almost certain that they will interact
with students who are eligible for protections under the ADA, Section
504, or the IDEA, making all three laws pertinent to the issues
involving SROs. The ADA and Section 504 are broadly applicable civil
rights laws intended to ensure that disabled individuals have equal
access to and participation in society, and they include requirements
that apply to law enforcement and to schools and education.83 The
IDEA is narrower, imposing requirements on states, local education
agencies, and schools that relate specifically to the administration of
schools and education services.84
Under their combined and overlapping requirements, the three
laws impose obligations to ensure that disabled individuals have an
equal opportunity to succeed, including by facilitating access and
ensuring that disabled individuals are not denied benefits or services
on the basis of their disability.85 In some instances, the requirements
under these laws entail affirmative obligations: such as providing
reasonable accommodations, modifications, or supplemental aids or
services.86 The affirmative obligations imposed by the ADA, Section
81. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.; see generally Disability Rights in Public Primary and Secondary
NAT’L
NETWORK
(2018),
Education:
How
Do
They
Relate?,
ADA
https://adata.org/factsheet/disability-rights-laws-public-primary-and-secondary-education-howdo-they-relate [hereinafter ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison] (summarizing and comparing the
three laws) (“Under IDEA, the child must have a specific disability (as defined in law) and must
need specially designed instruction and related services. A child can have a disability and be
covered under 504 and ADA (non-discrimination), but not require specially designed instruction
and thus not receive services under IDEA.”).
83. See ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82; Commonly Asked Questions
about the Americans with Disabilities Act and Law Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T JUST. C.R. DIV.,
DISABILITY RTS. SECTION (Revised Feb. 25, 2020) [hereinafter The ADA and Law Enforcement],
www.ada.gov/q&a_law.htm (“Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people with
disabilities in State and local governments services, programs, and employment. Law enforcement
agencies are covered . . . The ADA affects virtually everything that officers and deputies do . . .”).
84. See ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82.
85. See id.; The ADA and Law Enforcement, supra note 83.
86. The IDEA does not explicitly require accommodations or modifications, but they may
be required to fulfill the statutory requirement to provide a free appropriate public education
(FAPE) in the least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), (a)(4). The implementing
regulations for Title II of the ADA require, inter alia, that public entities “make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures . . . to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability” unless the modification would be a fundamental alteration. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
The implementing regulations of Section 504 require, inter alia, that disabled individuals are
provided with certain “supplementary aids and services.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a). The terms
“accommodation” and “modification” will be used interchangeably in this Note.
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504, and the IDEA are defining and unique features.
As law enforcement, SROs are generally held to different standards
than school personnel under federal, state, and local requirements
related to conduct, training, and supervision.87 Thus, the applicability of
these three laws to SRO interactions with students is unsettled.
Disability-based claims can be broadly categorized as: (1) arrest- or
force-based, often involving reasonable accommodation claims under
the ADA and Section 504, and (2) education-based, often involving
denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least
restrictive environment as required by the IDEA. Barriers to successful
claims under these statutes include fulfilling the exhaustion provision
of the IDEA,88 demonstrating a link between the student’s disability
and the SRO’s action, and meeting the standard for intent.89
a. The ADA and Section 504
Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination by state and
local government entities, including public schools.90 Title II states that
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.”91 Section 504 similarly prohibits
disability discrimination against individuals in programs that receive
federal funding, which includes most public schools.92 The ADA and
Section 504 target discrimination that Congress had perceived “to be
most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.”93 Central to the
87. For example, law enforcement must typically have probable cause to conduct a search,
while school personnel acting alone only need reasonable suspicion. See generally New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (“[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren
with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable
cause. . .”).
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). For a full discussion of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, see
generally Chris Ricigliano, Note, Exhausted and Confused: How Fry Complicated Obtaining
Relief for Disabled Students, 16 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 34 (2021).
89. Zirkel, supra note 11, at 321–22.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
91. Id.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (an individual with disabilities cannot, “solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency”).
93. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). The Supreme Court decided Choate
before the enactment of the ADA. “When Congress enacted the ADA a few years after Choate,
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ADA and Section 504, entities have an affirmative duty to prevent
disability-based discrimination and to provide reasonable
accommodations.94
To state a claim for discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a
plaintiff must show that:
(1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise
qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of a public entity’s
services, programs or activities; (3) she was either excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services,
programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the
public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination was by reason of her disability.95

The ADA and Section 504 define disability as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”96
Arrest- or force-based claims involving law enforcement are
typically brought for failure to provide reasonable accommodations,
failure-to-train, or for wrongful arrest in violation of the ADA and
Section 504.97 While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue,
it incorporated the disparate-impact interpretation into Title II: ‘It is . . . the Committee’s intent
that section 202 [ADA Title II] . . . be interpreted consistent with Alexander v. Choate.’” Mark C.
Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1417,
1442 (2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol56/iss4/4 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 84 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 367).
94. See, e.g., Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A plain
reading of the ADA evidences that Congress intended to impose an affirmative duty on public
entities to create policies or procedures to prevent discrimination based on disability.”); Pierce v.
District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d 250, 269 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[N]othing in the disability
discrimination statutes even remotely suggests that covered entities have the option of being
passive in their approach to disabled individuals as far as the provision of accommodations is
concerned. Quite to the contrary, . . . Section 504 and Title II mandate that entities act
affirmatively to evaluate the programs and services they offer and to ensure that people with
disabilities will have meaningful access to those services.”).
95. E.g., Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) rev’d in part
on other grounds, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted in part, and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1765
(2015). The standard to prove a prima facie case of discrimination is mostly the same under
Section 504 and Title II.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B).
97. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (“Courts have recognized at least two types of Title II
claims applicable to arrests: (1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a
disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; and (2)
reasonable accommodation, where . . . [police] fail to reasonably accommodate the person’s
disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or
indignity in that process than other arrestees.”); Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir.
2018) aff’g in part, vacating in part and remanding sub nom. Haberle for Est. of Nixon v. Borough
of Nazareth, 5:15-CV-02804, 2018 WL 4770682 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2018), rev’d and remanded sub
nom. Haberle v. Borough of Nazareth, 936 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that a general failure
to train police officers or institute policies does not violate Title II, but a failure to train that was
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most circuits have held that Title II of the ADA applies to law
enforcement during arrests and investigations, thus requiring that
police provide, among other things, reasonable accommodations to
disabled individuals.98 DOJ guidance also interprets Title II to apply
during arrests.99 In the school setting, plaintiffs may allege that the
municipality and SRO violated the ADA by, for example, failing to
modify “policies, practices, or procedures,” “failing to ensure policies,
practices, procedures, training, or supervision that take the needs of
children with disabilities into account,” or by maintaining “methods of
administration that have the effect of discriminating against persons
with disabilities.”100
A party can succeed on a Title II or Section 504 claim for injunctive
or declaratory relief even in the absence of discriminatory intent.101 To
recover damages, courts require proof of intent,102 although a party can
generally establish intent by proving deliberate indifference.103 For
example, in a case in Flint, Michigan, an SRO handcuffed a disabled
seven-year-old in response to non-threatening disability-related
misbehavior,104 the court found that the SRO did not need to have
specific knowledge of the child’s disability for a finding of
discrimination under the ADA.105 Inferring intentional discrimination
at issue during the incident may).
98. See, e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1231 (“Exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness
analysis under the ADA, just as they inform the distinct reasonableness analysis under the Fourth
Amendment.”). In circuits where the court has not explicitly addressed the question, lower courts
tend to find that Title II does apply during arrests. See, e.g., Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178 (concluding
that “the answer is generally yes” on the question of whether Title II applies during arrests); see
also Morais v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.06-582, 2007 WL 853811, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19,
2007) (“The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet addressed the application the
ADA or [Rehabilitation Act] to police activities and procedures, but a majority of courts now
hold that the ADA applies to arrests and similar police action in some circumstances.”).
99. See, e.g., The ADA and Law Enforcement, supra note 83 (stating that the ADA affects
“arresting, booking, and holding suspects”).
100. E.g., McCadden v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244, *15 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 12, 2019).
101. See, e.g., McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 768 F.3d 1135, 1147 n.8 (11th Cir.
2014) (“Where a plaintiff is not seeking compensatory damages, discriminatory intent is not
required.”)
102. See, e.g., Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093, 1108 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Our circuit
requires proof of intentional discrimination before a plaintiff can recover compensatory damages
under section 504, and we have suggested that as much is required under Title II.” (cleaned up)).
103. See, e.g., McCullum, 768 F.3d at 1146–47 (“[A] plaintiff must show that a defendant
violated his rights under the statutes and did so with discriminatory intent. A plaintiff may prove
discriminatory intent by showing that a defendant was deliberately indifferent to his statutory
rights.” (cleaned up)).
104. McCadden, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244, at *2.
105. Id. at *20–21 (“[I]ntentional discrimination may be inferred from a defendant’s
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from the defendant-city’s deliberate indifference, the court explained
that “the City knew or should have known about the elevated
likelihood that any Flint juveniles would suffer from a disability and
should have taken action to address how officers interact with Flint
juveniles.”106 In addition, facially neutral policies that have
discriminatory impact may also violate the ADA.107
However, if there are exigent circumstances when an officer uses
force, courts often find that accommodations were unreasonable.108
Courts consider a variety of factors when evaluating exigent
circumstances and the reasonableness of accommodations during
arrest or investigations.109 In Wilson v. City of Southlake, for example,
the Fifth Circuit considered the school setting, the SRO’s knowledge of
the child’s disability, and the relative threat.110 The court concluded that
the SRO was subject to the requirements of Title II because “[t]here
was no potentially life-threatening situation or threat to human life.”111
b. The IDEA
The IDEA requires that eligible students receive a free appropriate
public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment
appropriate to the individual’s needs.112 The IDEA includes a “childdeliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely
result in a violation of federally protected rights.” (citing Velzen v. Grand Valley State Univ., 902
F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1046 (W.D. Mich. 2012)).
106. Id. at *20 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the ADA claim).
107. See, e.g., McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have
repeatedly recognized that facially neutral policies may violate the ADA when such policies
unduly burden disabled persons, even when such policies are consistently enforced.”).
108. Compare Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801–02 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that police
are not subject to the requirements of Title II while there are exigent circumstances) with Gohier
v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] broad rule categorically excluding arrests
from the scope of Title II . . . is not the law.”).
109. See Carly A. Myers, Note, Police Violence against People with Mental Disabilities: The
Immutable Duty under the ADA to Reasonable Accommodate during Arrest, 70 VAND. L. REV.
1393, 1411 (2017) (explaining that, in incidents with people with mental illness, courts seem to
consider the “nature and history of a person’s mental illness; the officer’s knowledge of the
individual’s disability; the physical setting and conditions giving rise to the incident; and the
presence, degree, and immediacy of danger to the person with a disability, the officers, or the
general public”).
110. 936 F.3d 326, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2019).
111. Id. at 331.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)–(5) (“A free appropriate public education is available to all
children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21. . .”). Children are
eligible under the IDEA if they have a specific disability (as defined in the law) and require
“special education and related services” because of that disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a). Schools
must develop an Individualized Education Program (IEP) describing the needs of and services
for each eligible child. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (defining requirements for IEPs). The IDEA also
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find” provision that affirmatively requires schools to identify eligible
students.113 The IDEA also imposes requirements regarding
suspensions, expulsions, and management of disability-related behavior
with the overarching aim of reducing the systematic exclusion of
students with disabilities from education, especially when it results
from behaviors that are a manifestation of their disability.114 If a
student’s disability causes a behavior, the student cannot be suspended,
expelled or otherwise disciplined for that behavior.115 Federal law does
not explicitly prohibit the use of restraint and seclusion, but they may
violate the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504 in some cases.116
Education-based claims are typically brought against schools for a
denial of FAPE stemming from an SRO-related incident or an SRO’s
conduct.117 Student-plaintiffs generally claim that the SROs’ conduct
violated the IDEA’s requirements related to discipline or
suspensions.118 However, such claims generally fail, as courts typically
do not hold SROs to the requirements of the IDEA in the same manner
as other school personnel.119
Applied in the school setting, the ADA, Section 504, and the IDEA
reflect policy aims and legislative presumptions that students “will be
educated with children without disabilities and will be removed from
the classroom or placed in special classes only when necessary to meet
their individual needs,” and that they will “receive educational services
in the regular educational environment with the appropriate aids and
services necessary to ensure they benefit from educational
opportunities.”120 Existing federal law does not adequately address how
requires school to consult with parents or guardians and follow due process procedures. 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1414, 1415.
113. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3), (a)(10)(A)(ii) (West 2020).
114. See generally ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82.
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)–(F); see also Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at Section II
(describing requirements under the IDEA and Department of Education guidance (issued in
2016) related to behavioral interventions that are intended to address disabled students’
“undesired” disability-related behaviors); DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 1 (Aug.
1, 2016) https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/dcl-on-pbis-in-ieps-08-01-2016.pdf (warning school districts
that failure to provide adequate behavioral supports to students with disabilities could violate
federal education law).
116. 2017-2018 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: THE USE OF RESTRAINT AND
SECLUSION ON CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN K-12 SCHOOLS, supra note 46, at 4.
117. See Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 259–265 (describing cases where SRO conduct
contravened requirements in students’ IEP or behavior intervention plan).
118. Id.
119. See id. (explaining that SROs are typically not bound by students’ IEPs and behavior
intervention plans).
120. ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (requiring

HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS & DISABILITY RIGHTS

3/11/2021 6:44 PM

207

these aims can continue to be implemented and protected when SROs,
not just school personnel, are regularly interacting with students in the
school environment.
B. States have the power to guarantee positive rights and treat federal
law as a “floor,” but many fall into lockstep with federal law,
treating it as a ceiling
Federal provisions have proven inadequate to protect disabled
students from harm by SROs and to remedy that harm after it occurs.
But states have the ability to implement additional protections that
exceed the floor set by federal law. To limit the harm from SROs, states
should adopt policies that exceed the floor set by federal law, and courts
should avoid reflexive lockstepping when interpreting state provisions.
State courts often interpret state constitutional provisions in
lockstep with federal courts’ interpretations of the analog provision of
the U.S. Constitution, even though such interpretations are not
required.121 A “highly generalized guarantee,” such as a restriction on
searches, need not mean the same thing to different sovereigns.122
Nevertheless, “state courts have relied heavily—at times completely
and explicitly—on federal constitutional doctrine when interpreting
their own charters, even when the language, history, and intent of the
latter are distinct.”123
Among other names, scholars have referred to this concept as
“judicial federalism,” “new judicial federalism,” and “lockstepping.”124
Judge Jeffrey Sutton defined lockstepping as “the tendency of some
state courts to diminish their constitutions by interpreting them in
that programs are administered “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities”); 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (requiring programs to educate
qualified “handicapped” people “with persons who are not handicapped to the maximum extent
appropriate to the needs of the handicapped person”); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the
maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are
not disabled, and . . . removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment occurs only when . . . education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids
and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”).
121. See Blocher, supra note 15, at 325 (“[S]cholars, state courts, and even Supreme Court
Justices have repeatedly noted that state constitutions need not be interpreted in line with the
federal Constitution.”) (citations omitted).
122. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 174 (2018) (ebook) (“Why the meaning
of a federal guarantee in these areas (or any other) proves the meaning of an independent state
guarantee is rarely explained and often seems inexplicable.”).
123. Blocher, supra note 15, at 325.
124. This paper will primarily use the term “lockstepping” because it is the most intuitive and
clear. Blocher notes that, while accurate, the term “is widely reviled by scholars of state
constitutional law. See id. at 340.
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reflexive imitation of the federal courts’ interpretation of the Federal
Constitution.”125 State courts typically consider federal constitutional
claims first, and then “summarily announce that the state provision
means the same thing.”126 Sutton argues against lockstepping and
contends that there are immense benefits when states try out a “new”
idea before the country “takes on the risks associated with
implementing it.”127 In addition, Professor Joseph Blocher argues that
courts should give more weight to state constitutional doctrine in
federal constitutional cases.128
Multiple scholars cite the positive right to public education that
many states confer as an example of an area of state constitutional law
that is not in lockstep with the U.S. Constitution.129 Indeed, “every state
constitution currently contains at least one constitutional provision
regarding public education.”130 These provisions have generally been
applied to school funding and resource allocation131 in conferring a
positive right to education.132 After the Supreme Court “definitively
rejected the idea that the U.S. Constitution contained the right to an
education” in 1972, plaintiffs increasingly turned to state constitutional

125. Sutton, supra note 122, at 174.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 177 (“There will never be a healthy ‘discourse’ between state and federal judges
about the meaning of core guarantees in our American constitutions if the state judges merely
take sides on the federal debates and federal authorities, as opposed to marshaling the distinct
state texts and histories and drawing their own conclusions from them.”).
128. Blocher, supra note 15, at 327–28 (noting that the Supreme Court has looked to state
law for guidance in criminal procedure cases, due process cases, and Eighth Amendment cases).
129. See generally EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES:
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS ch. 5 (2013) (ebook)
(describing state constitutional treatment of education as an example of a tradition of positive
rights in the U.S.); SUTTON, supra note 122 (describing the state and federal “stories” of different
illustrative rights, including public education); Blocher, supra note 15, at 333 (“Many [state
constitutions] guarantee ‘positive’ rights—obligations on the government to provide public
education, for example—which are unheard of in the federal system.” (cleaned up)); Liu, supra
note 13, at 1313 (“Many state constitutions also have provisions that mandate government
provision of social services, such as education and welfare, and state courts have held that these
provisions confer positive rights that the Supreme Court has refused to recognize under the
Federal Constitution.”).
130. Zackin, supra note 129, at 67.
131. See generally id. at ch. 5 (describing the historical context of state constitutional
education provisions and the evolution of activism in response to state legislatures mismanaging
school funds).
132. Blocher, supra note 15, at 332–33. See generally Emily Parker, 50-State Review:
Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Mar. 2016),
http://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education1.pdf (providing a 50-state overview of the constitutional foundation for public education in each
state).
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claims instead.133 A lack of recourse under the U.S. Constitution
prompted “a new wave of textual education rights.”134 By 2007, the state
high courts in all but seven states had considered the constitutionality
of state systems of public school financing: Courts in twenty-six of those
states held that the ways in which the state funded its school system
was unconstitutional.135
Litigants’ use of dual federal and state constitutional claims became
a “widespread option” in the 1960s and 1970s after the Supreme Court
incorporated most of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause.136 After incorporation and during the
Warren Court era, “state constitutional law emerged as an independent
legal force, but only where it exceeded the federal floor.”137 As the
Supreme Court shifted right under the Burger Court, however, state
constitutional law once again garnered more attention from advocates
as “it was now possible that a state constitutional claim might succeed
where its federal analogue would fail.”138 In a 1991 guide to
Massachusetts civil rights laws, a civil rights attorney advocated for the
use of state civil rights laws amid “federal judicial retrenchment,”
writing that “state civil rights law offers promising new approaches to

133. Zackin, supra note 129, at 98 (describing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973)). In response to Rodriguez and the “closure” of “the federal courts . . . to those who
seek to overturn educational finance systems through the federal Equal Protection Clause,”
education activists “challeng[ed] education financing on state constitutional grounds and in state
courts.” Id. at 99.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 128 (citing Michael Paris, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE
POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 46 (2010)); see also Alia Wong, The Students Suing for
ATLANTIC,
a
Constitutional
Right
to
Education,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/11/lawsuit-constitutional-righteducation/576901/ (“[E]ducational equity is the most active area of litigation regarding state
constitutions in [state] courts . . . Such suits have been brought in pretty much every state, more
than half of which—60 percent—have resulted in a finding that there is a right to a high-quality
education under the respective state constitution . . .”).
136. Sutton, supra note 122, at 175.
137. Blocher, supra note 15, at 336 (“[S]ince relatively few state courts were inclined to read
rights more broadly than the Warren Court, the Federal Reporter effectively displaced state
constitutions. . . [M]any state courts, knowing that federal rights were so expansive, tended to
resolve cases on the basis of federal guarantees rather than state analogues. The result was an
atrophying of state constitutional interpretation.”)
138. Id. at 337. “[L]iberals urged state courts to ‘step into the breach’ left by the Burger
Court’s ‘contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of federalism.’” Id. at 337 (quoting
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986)). Justice Brennan’s 1977
Harvard Law Review article, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” “in
which he called on state courts to reclaim ground the Burger Court had allegedly given away” was
the “Magna Carta” of the “movement.” Id.

HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

210

3/11/2021 6:44 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 16

the stubborn problems of discrimination.”139
With ongoing harm from inappropriate conduct by SROs and limits
on remedies under federal law, state constitutions and civil rights laws
could again offer additional approaches. As Justice Goodwin Liu of the
California Supreme Court emphasized, “state courts, as the ultimate
arbiters of state law, have the prerogative and duty to interpret their
state constitutions independently.”140 Advocates and policy makers
should look to state provisions as part of a broad strategy to limit the
harms from SROs and raise the floor set by federal law.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE-LEVEL SOLUTIONS AS A POTENTIAL
SOURCE FOR REMEDIES FOR INAPPROPRIATE SRO CONDUCT
SRO-related problems lend themselves to analysis under a
lockstepping framework because, in the absence of adequate federal
remedies, states have increasingly enacted legislation and regulations
relating to SROs and school discipline. States have imposed limitations
on the use of corporal punishment and restraint and seclusion and
enacted requirements for SRO training and delineation of duties.
States have also established best practices for school districts and law
enforcement agencies, including requiring or recommending the use of
MOUs.141 To evaluate the potential of state law remedies in the context
of SROs, I started by identifying state laws and regulations that either
mirror or exceed protections under the federal provisions upon which
litigants often rely, including civil rights and equal protection laws and
regulations, and SRO and school discipline laws and regulations.142 I
then selected one state—Massachusetts—for in-depth research.
Massachusetts has, at various points in time, been seen as providing
more protections for people with disabilities than federal law,143 and it
139. Marjorie Heins, Massachusetts Civil Rights Law, 76 MASS. L. REV. 77, 96 (1991)
(“Massachusetts has the constitutional and statutory tools to redress the real economic and social
harm, as well as the insult to human dignity, that results from invidious discrimination against any
group.”).
140. Liu, supra note 13, at 1315 (emphasis in original).
141. See generally Zeke Perez Jr. and Ben Erwin, A Turning Point: School Resource Officers
and State Policy, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES: EDNOTE (July 9, 2020),
https://ednote.ecs.org/a-turning-point-school-resource-officers-and-state-policy/
(describing
trends and collecting sources on different policies).
142. This Note did not include analysis of state tort laws and criminal laws, or administrative
exhaustion requirements.
143. For example, Massachusetts was one of the first states to pass a law protecting the rights
of disabled students in education, doing so before Congress enacted the IDEA. See generally Gary
L. Monserud, The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
18 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 675 (2004) (providing a detailed account of
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is one of nine states that has received a rating of “meets requirements
and purposes of IDEA” every year since 2014.144
Nonetheless, while Massachusetts has instituted a number of
reforms over the past decade, students in the state still experience a
criminalized school environment: Massachusetts law requires at least
one SRO per district, with some exceptions.145 And disabled students
are disproportionately disciplined. During the 2018–2019 school year,
36.4 percent of students disciplined for non-violent, non-drug, or noncriminal offenses were disabled students, though they represent just
19.2 percent of the student body.146
Massachusetts’s constitution, laws, and regulations may offer viable
avenues for challenging SROs’ inappropriate use of force and restraints
on students with disabilities. But there is effectively no federal or state
court precedent applying these provisions to incidents with SROs,
making it difficult to determine if remedies are indeed available. In
addition, analysis of Massachusetts laws and regulations reveals that
claims against SROs for use of force may face numerous barriers to
success: Some regulations may not apply to or be enforceable against
Massachusetts’s special education mandate and the amendment to adopt the federal standard in
2002, and suggesting that, in actuality, the pre-2002 standard was applied as a less rigorous
“maximum feasible” standard, not “maximum possible”). Compare Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch.,
467 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Mass. 1984) (recognizing the more stringent state-law standard) and David
D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 423 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court’s
finding that “since Massachusetts law mandated a level of substantive benefits superior to that of
the federal Act, the state standard would be utilized as determinative of what was an ‘appropriate’
education for the child”) with E.T. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of the Div. of Admin. L.
Appeals, 91 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 n.1 (D. Mass. 2015) (“Massachusetts had previously adhered to the
higher standard of ‘maximum possible development’ before adopting the federal standard of ‘free
appropriate public education.’”).
144. Based on the U.S. Department of Education determination letters for 2014 to 2020
evaluating states’ implementation of the IDEA Part B. For simplicity, only the determination
year, date of publication or revision, and the hyperlink are provided for determinations prior to
2020. Off. of Special Educ. and Rehab. Servs., 2020 Determination Letters on State Implementation
of IDEA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Revised Nov. 25, 2020), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/2020determination-letters-on-state-implementation-of-idea/#IDEA-Part-B-Determinations-MeetsRequirements (Part B); 2019, (Modified July 11, 2019), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/2019determination-letters-on-state-implementation-of-idea/#IDEA-Part-B-Determinations-MeetsRequirements; 2018, (July 24, 2018), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/2018-determinationletters-on-state-implementation-of-idea/#IDEA-Part-B-Determinations-Meets-Requirements;
2017, (Revised July 12, 2017), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/ideafactsheet-determinations2017.pdf; 2016, (Revised July 10, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/fund/data/report/idea/ideafactsheetdeterminations-2016.pdf; 2015, (June 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/fund/data/report/idea/2015ideafactsheet-determinations.pdf;
2014,
(revised
April
2015)
https://www2.ed.gov/fund/data/report/idea/finalrev0413152014ideafactsheet-determinations.pdf.
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020).
146. 2019–20 Student Discipline Data Report, MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUC., https://profiles.doe.mass.edu/statereport/ssdr.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).

HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

212

3/11/2021 6:44 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 16

SROs, or the standard for enforcement may impose too high a bar to
hold SROs accountable for most instances of use of force. This section
will first summarize several Massachusetts provisions, including (1) an
SRO law and laws and regulations about discipline in schools,147 (2)
constitutional and statutory civil rights provisions,148 and (3) the
constitutional provision protecting against unreasonable search and
seizure.149 Then, this section will evaluate whether the provisions are in
lockstep with federal analogs or could provide additional remedies,150
and consider limitations in raising claims under Massachusetts
provisions.
A. Overview of Massachusetts Provisions
1. State limits on corporal punishment, physical restraints, and
SROs in schools.
Massachusetts General Laws ch. 71, § 37P (“the SRO Law”)
requires at least one SRO per district, with limited exceptions.151 The
SRO Law defines the SRO role152 and imposes some requirements and
recommendations for SRO hiring and operations.153 Under this law,
school superintendents and the police department providing the
SRO(s) are required to enter into a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) that “clearly defin[es] the role and duties of the school
resource officer.”154 The SRO Law requires that SRO hiring not be
147. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 37G
(West 2020); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.00 (2016).
148. MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV (barring disability discrimination); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 93 § 103 (West 2020) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020)
(Massachusetts Civil Rights Act).
149. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV.
150. This Note has not examined issues of claim preclusion and exhaustion under various
Massachusetts frameworks. The analysis that follows is intended as an illustration of how a
lockstepping framework may be useful, not as a complete canvassing of potential claims.
151. The requirement was included in the Massachusetts Gun Violence Reduction Act, 2014
Mass. Acts 284, which was passed in the aftermath of the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook
Elementary School. The act states, “[e]very chief of police, in consultation with the
superintendent and subject to appropriation, shall assign at least 1 school resource officer to serve
the city, town, commonwealth charter school, regional school district or county agricultural
school.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(b).
152. Massachusetts defines SRO as “a duly sworn municipal police officer with all necessary
training, up-to-date certificates or a special officer appointed by the chief of police charged with
providing law enforcement and security services to elementary and secondary public schools.”
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(a) (West 2020).
153. See generally Rights Regarding School Resource Officers in Massachusetts, MENTAL
HEALTH
LEGAL
ADVISORS
COMM.
(February
2015),
https://mhlac.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/ed_school_resource_officers.pdf (describing the SRO law).
154. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, §§ 37P(b), (e) (West 2020). The Massachusetts Attorney
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based solely on seniority and requires the police chief to consider
certain criteria such as personality, character, and specialized
training.155 However, the SRO Law leaves police chiefs with
considerable discretion in assigning SROs, stating that “the chief of
police shall assign an officer that the chief believes would strive to foster
an optimal learning environment and educational community.”156
Under the SRO Law, MOUs must state that SROs cannot “serve as
school disciplinarians, as enforcers of school regulations or in place of
licensed school psychologists, psychiatrists or counselors and that
SROs shall not use police powers to address traditional school
discipline issues, including non-violent disruptive behavior.”157 The
SRO Law also limits liability, stating that no public employer will be
liable for actions or omissions “in the scope of the public employee’s
employment and arising out of the implementation of” the SRO Law
and that the SRO Law does not “creat[e] or impos[e] a specific duty of
care.”158
In the school setting, Massachusetts’s laws and regulations restrict
use of force in the forms of corporal punishment,159 mechanical
restraint, and physical restraint to “ensure that every student
participating in a Massachusetts public education program is free from
the use of physical restraint.”160 Use of restraints is regulated under
Title 603, sections 46.00 through 46.06 of the Code of Massachusetts
Regulations (“the Restraint Regulation”). The Restraint Regulation
states that mechanical restraints and seclusion are “prohibited in public

General’s office released a model MOU in 2018. Office of Attorney General Maura Healey, State
Agencies Release Model Memorandum of Understanding for Massachusetts School Resource
Officers, MASS.GOV (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/news/state-agencies-release-modelmemorandum-of-understanding-for-massachusetts-school-resource; Office of Attorney General
Maura Healey, SRO MOU Final, MASS.GOV (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/doc/sro-moufinal-9-5-18 [hereinafter Model MOU].
155. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(e) (West 2020)
156. See id. at § 37P(b) (emphasis added). The law continues, “The chief of police shall give
preference to candidates who demonstrate the requisite personality and character to work with
children and educators in a school environment and who have received specialized training
relating to working with adolescents and children, including cognitive development, de-escalation
techniques, and alternatives to arrest and diversion strategies.” Id.
157. Id. The SRO Law requires that MOUs state the requirement in the accompanying text.
The model MOU states, “Under state law, the SRO shall not serve as a school disciplinarian . . .
.” Model MOU, supra note 154, at 6. The SRO law could be interpreted to imply that SROs are,
in actuality, prohibited from such actions, or it could be read as simply requiring the statement in
the MOU as an expression of policy preference.
158. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(f) (West 2020).
159. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 37G (West 2020).
160. 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.01(2) (2016).
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education programs.”161 School committees, teachers, employees, and
agents of “the school committee,” are also restricted from using
corporal punishment,162 and from using physical restraints unless
performed by trained, qualifying personnel in “emergency situations,
after . . . less intrusive alternatives have failed or been deemed
inappropriate.”163 The Restraint Regulation requires program staff to
review and consider disability-related factors specific to an individual
student before employing physical restraints.164 Restraint is not to be
used “[a]s a response to property destruction, disruption of school
order, a student’s refusal to comply with a . . . rule or staff directive, or
verbal threats when those actions that do not constitute a threat of
assault, or imminent, serious, physical harm.”165
The limits on corporal punishment do not, however, prohibit school
personnel and their agents from “using such reasonable force as is
necessary to protect pupils, other persons, and themselves from an
assault by a pupil.”166 In addition, the Restraint Regulation does not

161. Id. at 46.03(1)(a). Mechanical restraint is “the use of any physical device or equipment
to restrict a student’s freedom of movement.” Id. at 46.02. Seclusion is “involuntary confinement
of a student alone in a room or area from which the student is physically prevented from leaving.”
Id.
162. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37G(a) (West 2020) (“The power of the school
committee or of any teacher or any other employee or agent of the school committee to maintain
discipline upon school property shall not include the right to inflict corporal punishment upon
any pupil.”).
163. 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.01(3) (2016). Physical restraints are defined as “direct
physical contact that prevents or significantly restricts a student’s freedom of movement.” Id. at
46.02. The use of “prone” physical restraint is barred except under a few exceptions that all
require advance documentation. Id. at 46.03(1)(b). Prone restraint is “a physical restraint in which
a student is placed face down on the floor or another surface, and physical pressure is applied to
the student’s body to keep the student in the face-down position.” Id. at 46.02. See generally Rights
Regarding the Use of Restraint in Massachusetts Public Schools, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL
ADVISORS
COMM.
(January
2016),
https://mhlac.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/restraint_in_Mass_public_schools.pdf (summarizing Massachusetts
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education restraint regulations).
164. See 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.05(5)(d) (2016) (requiring program staff to make certain
safety considerations, including to “review and consider any known medical or psychological
limitations . . . and/or behavioral intervention plans regarding the use of physical restraint on an
individual student” and noting that “[n]othing in 603 CMR 46.00 shall be construed to limit the
protection afforded publicly funded students under other state or federal laws, including those
laws that provide for the rights of students who have been found eligible to receive special
education services”).
165. Id. at 46.03(2)(c). Further, the regulation provides that school personnel using physical
restraints should have “two goals in mind:” to only use when necessary to protect “a student
and/or a member of the school community from . . . imminent, serious, physical harm; and . . . to
prevent or minimize any harm to the student as a result of the use of physical restraint.” Id. at
46.01(3)(a–b).
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37G(b) (West 2020).
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prohibit law enforcement or school security personnel “from exercising
their responsibilities, including the physical detainment of a student or
other person alleged to have committed a crime or posing a security
risk.”167 It is unclear whether SROs are subject to the restrictions in the
Restraint Regulation. However, a Massachusetts Department of
Education guidance document states that “anyone employed by the
school district and working in a school security role (e.g., school
resource officer) should receive the in-depth training.”168
2. State limits on disability-based discrimination and the state Civil
Rights Act.
Article 114 of the Massachusetts Constitution, Section 103 of the
Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA), and the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act (MCRA) are the primary state provisions that protect
people from discrimination on the basis of disability. Article 114 and
MERA § 103 both “exist to address the ‘pervasive unequal treatment
of individuals with disabilities,’ who ‘have been faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society.’”169
Unlike the U.S. Bill of Rights, Article 114 explicitly prohibits disability
discrimination.170 It states that “[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped
individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination
under any program or activity within the commonwealth.”171 The
language of Article 114 is broad, and although it was modeled after
Section 504, it applies to public and private entities and parties, even if
they do not receive state or federal funds.172 Thus, Article 114 has a
167. 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.03(4)(b) (2016).
168. Questions & Answer Guide Related to Implementation of 603 CMR 46.00, MASS. DEP’T
OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC. (last updated September 3, 2020),
https://www.doe.mass.edu/sfs/safety/restraint.html [hereinafter Mass. Questions & Answer
Guide]. Similarly, it states elsewhere that “Any employee whose duties are primarily related to
maintaining school safety (e.g., school resource officers) should be included in the in-depth
training.” The guidance document also reiterates that “Nothing in 603 CMR 46.00 prohibits law
enforcement, judicial authorities or school security personnel from exercising their
responsibilities.” Id.
169. Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Ct. Dep’t, 120 N.E.3d 297, 314 (Mass. 2019) (quoting
In re McDonough, 930 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (2010)).
170. MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV.
171. Id.
172. Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306, 324 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Grubba v. Bay
State Abrasives, Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d 746, 747–48 (1st Cir. 1986)) (“By its plain
language, the amendment does not limit the pool of potential defendants to public actors. . . .”);
Heins, supra note 139, at 88 (Article 114 “reaches beyond the various handicap discrimination
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broader scope than Section 504.
A decade after ratifying Article 114, Massachusetts amended
MERA173 to provide expressly for equal rights and reasonable
accommodations for people with disabilities.174 MERA § 103 states in
relevant part:
Any person within the commonwealth, regardless of handicap or
age . . . shall, with reasonable accommodation, have the same rights
as other persons . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property, including, but
not limited to, the rights secured under Article CXIV of the
Amendments to the Constitution.175

Section 103(c) specifies that courts should evaluate claims under
the statute based on the “totality of the circumstances,” and provides a
civil cause of action in Superior Court for injunctive and equitable
relief, including compensatory and exemplary damages, and for
attorney’s fees.176
MCRA is the state’s equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.177 It provides a
right of action when “any person or persons, whether or not acting
under color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, or
attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the
exercise or enjoyment” of another person’s rights.178 Liability “may be
predicated upon violations of either the federal or state
constitutions,”179 or upon violations of federal or state laws.180 The
limited application of MCRA to interferences based on “threats,
intimidation or coercion” is a higher standard for liability than what is
required under § 1983.181 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
prohibitions in employment, housing and public accommodations that are now found in c. 151B
and c.272.”); see also Disability Rights Laws in Massachusetts, MASS. OFF. ON DISABILITY,
https://www.mass.gov/doc/disability-rights-laws-in-massachusetts/download
(describing
Massachusetts laws as of June 1, 2015) (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
173. See generally Heins, supra note 139, at 85–86 (describing the history of MERA).
174. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 103 (West 2020).
175. Id. Handicap is defined by reference to Title XXI Labor And Industries, Chapter 151B,
§ 1. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (2020) (“The term ‘handicap’ means (a) a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities of a person; (b) a record
of having such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such impairment. . .”).
176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 103(c–d) (West 2020).
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020).
178. Id. at § 11H (providing a right of action to the state Attorney General). Section 11I
creates an individual right of action for the violations described in § 11H, and provides for
injunctive and equitable relief, including compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at § 11I.
179. Nuon v. City of Lowell, 768 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 n.3 (D. Mass. 2011).
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020).
181. Deptula v. City of Worcester, No. 17-40055-TSH, 2020 WL 1677633, at *7 (D. Mass.
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has defined each term: A “threat” is the “intentional exertion of
pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm”;
“[i]ntimidation involves putting in fear for the purpose of compelling
or deterring conduct;”182 and coercion involves “physical or moral”
force applied to another to get them to act against their will and do
something they “would not otherwise have done.”183 MCRA “affords
the same standards of qualified immunity for public officials as that
applicable under § 1983.”184 But unlike § 1983, MCRA applies to both
public and private actors.185
3. State limits on unreasonable search and seizure.
Article 14, Massachusetts’s correlate of the Fourth Amendment,
protects the right for “[e]very subject . . . to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his
papers, and all his possessions.”186 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has held that Article 14 provides more substantive
protection than the Fourth Amendment in some areas, including a
broader definition of “seizure.”187 In other areas, however, such as
probable cause for arrest, Article 14 is in lockstep with the Fourth
Amendment.188 There is little case law on Article 14 and seizures in the
Apr. 6, 2020) (quoting Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 52 (Mass. 1989)).
182. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Mass. 1994)
(cleaned up).
183. Id. (quoting Coercion, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959)).
184. Brown v. Butler, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-30030-MAP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219572,
at *42–43 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2017). See also, e.g., Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir.
2010) (“Most importantly here, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that
MCRA claims are subject to the same standard of immunity for police officers that is used for
claims asserted under § 1983.”).
185. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Mass. 1985)
(“[MCRA] extended beyond the limits of its Federal counterpart by incorporating private action
within its bounds. . . . [T]he Legislature intended to provide a remedy under G.L. c. 12, § 11I,
coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except that the Federal statute requires State action whereas
its State counterpart does not.”).
186. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV. Ratified in 1780, Article 14 was a model for the crafting
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161 (1947) (“The
Fourth Amendment . . . derives from the similar provision in the first Massachusetts
Constitution.”).
187. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lyles, 905 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 n.1 (Mass. 2009) (“We have
held that art. 14 provides more substantive protection than does the Fourth Amendment in
defining the moment when an individual’s personal liberty has been significantly restrained by
police such that the individual may be said to have been ‘seized’ within the meaning of art. 14.”).
188. See, e.g., Brown, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219572, at *38 n.10 (quoting Nuon v. City of
Lowell, 768 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The standard for probable cause for arrest
under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights mirrors that of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363,
1367 (Mass. 1992) (citing Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 554 (Mass. 1985))
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school setting,189 so it is difficult to determine the extent to which the
more protective standard would extend to schools. The Supreme Court
has held that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy is more limited in
the school setting,190 but the standard for SROs—as opposed to nonlaw-enforcement school officials—is far less clear.
In Commonwealth v. Evelyn, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stated that “[Article] 14 provides more substantive
protection than does the Fourth Amendment in defining the moment
of seizure.”191 Comparing seizure under the Fourth Amendment to
seizure under Article 14, the court explained that the former occurs
when a reasonable person believes they are not free to leave.192 Under
the latter, “a seizure occurs when an officer, ‘through words or conduct,
objectively communicate[s] that the officer would use his or her police
power to coerce [an individual] to stay.’”193 Like the Fourth
Amendment standard, the court applies an objective reasonableness
standard under Article 14.194 And, as with the Fourth Amendment, age
may be a relevant factor in the court’s Article 14 analysis of whether a
seizure occurred and whether it was objectively reasonable.195 In
Evelyn, the court held that
[A] child’s age, when known to the officer or objectively apparent
to a reasonable officer, is relevant to the question of seizure under
(“Certainly, art. 14 imposes no higher standard than probable cause.”).
189. This note will not analyze the application of Article 14 to searches. For a (dated)
summary of case law on searches and seizures in schools, see Wendy Wolf & Perry Moriearty,
School Search And Seizure: An Overview Of The Law, JUV. DEF. NETWORK, YOUTH ADVOC.
DEP’T - COMM. FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVS. (2010), https://www.publiccounsel.net/ya/wpcontent/uploads/sites/6/2014/08/school-search-and-seizure.pdf.
190. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–43 (1985); see also Commonwealth v. Snyder,
597 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Mass. 1992) (“It is consistent with the requirements of art. 14, except
where a school employee is explicitly acting on behalf of law enforcement officials, for a school
employee to conduct a search and seize drugs (guns and other contraband) in a school without
first obtaining a search warrant.”).
191. 152 N.E.3d 108, 117 (Mass. 2020) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lyles, 905
N.E.2d at 1107 n.1).
192. Id. at 116 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)) (also citing
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)).
193. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Matta, 133 N.E.3d 258, 266 (Mass.
2019)); but see Commonwealth v. Fraser, 573 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1991) (“[T]he police do not effect
a seizure merely by asking questions unless the circumstances of the encounter are sufficiently
intimidating that a reasonable person would believe he was not free to turn his back on his
interrogator and walk away.”).
194. Evelyn, 152 N.E.3d. at 120. (“We maintain an objective standard so that officers can
‘determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment’
or art. 14.”).
195. Id. at 118. (comparing the custody and arrest contexts and finding that age is relevant in
each).
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art. 14. The question will be whether the officer objectively
communicated to a person of the juvenile’s apparent age that the
officer would use his or her police power to coerce the juvenile to
stay.196

Article 14 claims generally arise under MCRA and, as described
above, are subject to the same standard for qualified immunity as
claims under § 1983.197
B. Application and comparison of Massachusetts laws
While Massachusetts’s laws on discipline and corporal punishment
are more protective that federal laws, the state’s disability
discrimination provisions are largely in lockstep with federal laws. If an
SRO in Massachusetts used excessive force against a disabled student,
that student may be able to claim violations of her state constitutional
right to be free from disability discrimination guaranteed by Article 114
and MERA § 103. Protections under Article 14 may also offer
additional protection beyond those of the Fourth Amendment, but
there is little case law for evaluating the viability of an Article 14 claim
raised under MCRA.
Massachusetts law does exceed federal protections in its
prohibition of mechanical restraints in schools, corporal punishment,
and, except in limited circumstances, use of physical restraints.198
Massachusetts’s SRO Law also exceeds federal protections by
explicitly prohibiting SROs from using their police powers to address
school discipline issues and non-violent disruptive behavior.199 But it is
not clear that there is a sufficient state remedy when SROs violate these
laws—in particular, the SRO Law or the Restraint Regulation—or if
SROs will be held to the same standard as other school personnel.
1. Application of Massachusetts’s limits on corporal punishment,
physical restraints, and SROs in schools as compared to federal limits.
The SRO Law and the Restraints Regulation are more protective
of students than federal law. While unlikely, it is possible they might
support a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure
or excessive force raised under § 1983. The state provisions could be

196. Id.
197. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
198. See discussion supra Section III.A.1, note 161 (defining mechanical restraint), and note
163 (defining physical restraint).
199. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020).
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relevant to the qualified immunity analysis in a claim against an SRO
for arrest without probable cause.200 However, there are limitations to
these approaches.
When evaluating use of force under the Fourth Amendment
objective reasonableness standard, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances, including factors like the school setting and the child’s
age.201 In one case, for example, the school setting implied that “officers
should exercise more restraint when dealing with student misbehavior
in the school context.”202 Further, the court explained, the school setting
“weighs against the reasonableness of using handcuffs.”203 Courts
should consider the SRO Law, the Restraint Regulation, and the MOU
between the school and the local law enforcement agency as key factors
in analyzing the reasonableness of a seizure. In addition to generally
considering the school setting, courts should consider Massachusetts’s
specific limits on SROs and protections for students. Failure to train
SROs to understand Massachusetts’s restrictions arguably amounts to
deliberate indifference given the high likelihood that the SRO would
encounter situations where the provisions apply.204
However, Massachusetts’s SRO Law and Restraint Regulation
have limited application in Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983
except where a plaintiff is raising a wrongful arrest or arrest without
probable cause claim. This is because courts generally do not consider
state laws when determining if the defendant’s conduct violated
“clearly established law” for purposes of qualified immunity—courts’
analysis of whether law is clearly established relies on federal
200. See, e.g., Nuon v. City of Lowell, 768 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333–34 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting
that “unreasonable noise does not provide probable cause for the offense of disorderly conduct.
Moreover, federal and Massachusetts case law clearly established that neither speech nor
expressive conduct can properly form the basis of an arrest for disorderly conduct”).
201. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text (discussing objective reasonableness in
the school setting).
202. E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 183 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding that it was
unreasonable for an SRO to handcuff a “calm, compliant ten-year-old” who was on school
grounds and sitting “in a closed office surrounded by three adults,” but concluding that the SRO
was entitled to qualified immunity).
203. Id. at 183–84 (“Society expects that children will make mistakes in school—and, yes,
even occasionally fight. That teachers handle student misbehavior and unruliness ‘on a routine
basis without the use of any force’ suggests that force is generally unnecessary in the school
context.”).
204. See, e.g., McCadden v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244, *14
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2019) (“Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the City has failed to train its
police officers on appropriately interacting with juveniles who statistically, based on existing data
and studies, may have a disability that would dictate how an officer — particularly a School
Resource Officer — should interact with such a juvenile.”).
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constitutional precedents. State provisions may be relevant in some
cases, however, such as claims of wrongful arrest and arrest without
probable cause where the claim depends on the validity of the arrest,
i.e., whether the officer reasonably believed the arrestee violated or
was about to violate state or federal law.205 In Wilber v. Curtis, for
example, the plaintiff brought a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983
for arrest without probable cause.206 The court evaluated probable
cause in relation to the offenses that the officer believed the plaintiff
was committing, explaining that the plaintiff “must show that it was
clear under state law that there was not probable cause to arrest him for
this crime.”207
Take also a case involving an SRO in Kentucky. At the time, the
state’s regulations on corporal punishment, restraint, and discipline by
SROs were similar to Massachusetts’s.208 Two elementary school
children, S.R. and L.G., sued the county sheriff and the SRO after the
SRO handcuffed them each behind their backs at the biceps.209 The
SRO handcuffed S.R., an eight-year-old child who weighed 54-pounds,
because he swung his arm at the SRO.210 The SRO handcuffed L.G. on
multiple occasions, including after the 56-pound nine-year old hit and
blew snot at the SRO, and after she hit, kicked, and scratched a staff
member.211 The court described, but did not resolve, the question of
whether the SRO’s actions were done while in the role of school
personnel or in the role of law enforcement. If he were deemed to be
school personnel, his repeated handcuffing of students would violate a
205. See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Probable cause exists when the
arresting officer, acting upon apparently trustworthy information, reasonably concludes that a
crime has been (or is about to be) committed and that the putative arrestee likely is one of the
perpetrators.”); Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2017) (affirming the magistrate’s finding
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because state law did not clearly establish
that the officers did not have probable cause).
206. 872 F.3d at 19.
207. Id. at 22 (emphasis added) (“[F]or purposes of qualified immunity, it is not enough to
show that the officers may have made a mistaken determination about whether Wilber’s conduct
provided probable cause to conclude that he had committed the offense for which he was
arrested.”).
208. S.R. v. Kenton Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 302 F. Supp. 3d 821, 825–26 (E.D. Ky. 2017)
(describing that the contract between the county board of education and the sheriff’s department
prohibited SROs from disciplining students; a state regulation prohibited use of restraints
(including handcuffs) in most situations, including as punishment or discipline, but provided that
the regulation “does not prohibit the lawful exercise of law enforcement duties by sworn law
enforcement officers”).
209. Id. at 829–30.
210. Id. at 827.
211. Id. at 828–30. The SRO did not bring criminal charges against S.R. or L.G., testifying
that “none of what they did was worthy of trying to file a criminal charge.” Id. at 830.
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state regulatory bar on use of mechanical restraints, but if he were
deemed law enforcement, it might be permitted under the exception
for “lawful exercise of law enforcement duties.”212 The court denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the
seizures and use of force were unreasonable as a matter of law and that
the municipality was liable—regardless of the applicability of the
Kentucky regulation.213 In short, the court avoided determining the
applicability of the state’s regulation to the SRO to reach a liability
determination.214
In a case where an SRO’s actions were particularly severe, a court
might be able to avoid the question of the applicability of
Massachusetts’s regulations, as in S.R. But if a court did reach the issue,
it might conclude that the SRO was not acting in a school personnel
capacity and that the Restraint Regulation only applies to school
personnel, that the SRO Law or Restraint Regulation do not apply to
the behavior the SRO was responding to, or that the SRO Law is nonbinding because it explicitly limits liability for public employers and
does not impose a specific duty of care.
2. Application of Massachusetts’s Civil Rights Act and Article 14
as compared to § 1983.
On the one hand, MCRA imposes a high threshold for illegal
conduct by requiring threats, intimidation, or coercion,215 making it
unlikely that a plaintiff could successfully use MCRA to pursue a claim
against an SRO. On the other hand, Massachusetts’s broader definition
of seizure under Article 14 may bar more conduct than the Fourth
Amendment alone. Massachusetts also follows a lockstep application
of qualified immunity under § 1983.216 Use of force or seizure by law
enforcement “is not, in itself, coercive under the MCRA unless the
212. Id. at 832–33 (“Because SROs wear two hats while serving in Kentucky schools, it can
be difficult to discern when their actions constitute those of school personnel or those of law
enforcement. Moreover, the existence of a regulation prohibiting allegedly unconstitutional
conduct is but one factor in the Graham analysis.”).
213. Id. at 833.
214. Id. (“[T]he Court need not determine the applicability of 704 KAR 7:160 § 3(2)(a)
because [the SRO’s] seizure and use of force, under the facts of this case, were unreasonable, even
in the absence of the above regulation.”).
215. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020) (providing a right of action
when “any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interfere by threats,
intimidation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the
exercise or enjoyment” of another person’s rights). For an overview of MCRA, see notes 177–185
and accompanying text supra.
216. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.

HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS & DISABILITY RIGHTS

3/11/2021 6:44 PM

223

force is inflicted to achieve ‘some further purpose.’”217 Though there is
some disagreement on whether a Fourth Amendment violation alone
can give rise to a MCRA claim, most courts have found that it does
not.218 Similarly, a violation of Article 14 alone may be insufficient to
state a claim under MCRA absent threats, intimidation, or coercion.
But if an SRO made statements suggesting a purpose of punishing or
disciplining a student for behavior that stemmed from a disability, a
plaintiff may be able to bring a claim under MCRA for violating any of
the state or federal constitutional and statutory rights described
above.219
Cases with SROs in other jurisdictions have involved motives
suggestive of threats, intimidation, or coercion as defined by MCRA.
For example, in Gray v. Bostic, a case against an SRO in Georgia, the
Eleventh Circuit found that “[e]very reasonable officer would have
known that handcuffing a compliant nine-year-old child for purely
punitive purposes is unreasonable.”220 The court found that the seizure
“was justified at its inception” because the nine-year-old committed a
misdemeanor by threatening her teacher.221 However, the court held
that the SRO’s actions were not responding to an exigent threat, and
instead were intended to teach the student a lesson.222 Therefore, the
seizure was not “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified interference in the first place.”223 The court in Gray then
concluded that the SRO was not entitled to qualified immunity.224
Likewise, Massachusetts’s broader definition of what constitutes an
unreasonable seizure under Article 14 may allow students to challenge
a greater range of SRO conduct than under the Fourth Amendment
alone.225 Age can be a relevant factor when a court considers whether

217. Walker v. Jackson, 56 F. Supp. 3d 89, 95 (D. Mass. 2014) (quoting Gallagher v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2002 WL 924243, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 2002)).
218. Brown v. Butler, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-30030-MAP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219572,
at *41, n. 12 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2017).
219. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11H (West 2020) (providing a right of action for
violations of “rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured
by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth”).
220. Gray v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (applying the
standard from New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42, (1985)).
221. Id. at 1304 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341).
222. Id. at 1304–05 (“[T]he handcuffing was excessively intrusive given Gray’s young age and
the fact that it was not done to protect anyone’s safety.”).
223. Id.
224. Id. 1306–07 (applying the “obvious clarity” standard, described supra note 67).
225. See generally Section III.A.3, supra (describing Article 14, Massachusetts’s search and
seizure provision).
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a seizure occurred and whether it was objectively reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances.226 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts explained that “the naiveté, immaturity, and
vulnerability of a child will imbue the objective communications of a
police officer with greater coercive power.”227 Indeed, a student’s age is
likely to impact her own perception of when an SRO has committed a
seizure and “‘engaged in some show of authority’ that a reasonable
person would consider coercive.”228 So if the standard for establishing
that a seizure occurred is lower, it may thus be easier to establish that
an SRO’s seizure of a student violated Article 14. But proving that an
unconstitutional seizure alone occurred is insufficient to establish
liability under MCRA—the student would also have to demonstrate
that the seizure involved threats, intimidation, or coercion.229
In addition, courts should consider the SRO Law and Restraint
Regulation in evaluating a MCRA claim for excessive force or arrest
without probable cause in violation of Article 14.230 First, these state
laws show that the school setting and the attendant policy decisions are
relevant to the totality of circumstances inquiry. The legislature and the
Massachusetts Department of Education, respectively, made policy
judgments to restrict SRO authority and conduct under the SRO Law
and to broadly limit the use of restraints under the Restraint
Regulation. The state also recommended that SROs receive the same
training that school personnel authorized to administer restraints are
required to attend, albeit in a non-binding policy document.231 In any
event, these binding and non-binding policies evince the legislature’s
judgment that more should be done to keep students safe.
Second, a court should conclude that the state provisions limit the
scope of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity under MCRA mirrors
the standard under § 1983, so any MCRA analysis should look to state
statutes and precedents for identifying clearly established law.232 The
226. Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 152 N.E.3d 108, 118 (Mass. 2020) (finding that age can be a
relevant factor when determining whether a seizure occurred).
227. Id. (citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 (2011)).
228. Commonwealth v. Matta, 133 N.E.3d 258, 266 (Mass. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Sanchez, 531 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Mass. 1988)).
229. See notes 217–219 and accompanying text supra.
230. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV. See Section III.A, supra (describing the SRO Law and
Restraint Regulation).
231. Mass. Questions & Answer Guide, supra note 168.
232. See, e.g., Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Mass. 1989) (finding that “the law of
this State was not clearly established” such that it would indicate that the policy in question
violated Article 14).
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Restraint Regulation explicitly prohibits mechanical restraint in public
education programs,233 and the SRO Law234 prohibits SROs from using
police powers for traditional school discipline.235 The SRO Law also
requires training for SROs, and the Massachusetts Department of
Education recommends that SROs receive training on the Restraint
Regulation as well.236 Taken together, these policies should qualify as
“clearly established law,” and seizures employing banned methods
would clearly contravene such laws. But as with a Fourth Amendment
claim, a court may find that the Restraint Regulation does not apply
because the SRO was not acting in a school personnel capacity; that the
student’s behavior exempted the SRO from the SRO Law or Restraint
Regulation; or that the restrictions are non-binding.
3.
Application of Massachusetts’s disability discrimination
provisions as compared to federal provisions.
Massachusetts’s state disability discrimination provisions do not
clearly provide significant additional remedies or recourse beyond
what the ADA and Section 504 provide. Both Article 114237 and MERA
§ 103,238 which bar disability discrimination, have mostly been
interpreted in lockstep with the ADA and Section 504.239 In particular,
Article 114 mirrors the language of Section 504, and bars exclusion,
denial of benefits, or discrimination “solely by reason of” disability.240
233. 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.00 (2016).
234. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020).
235. See supra Section III.A.1 (describing the Restraint Regulation and the SRO Law).
236. Mass. Questions & Answer Guide, supra note 168.
237. MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV.
238. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 103 (West 2020).
239. For example, as with the ADA and Section 504, exclusion from benefits does not need
to be “complete” to qualify as discrimination under Art. 114. See, e.g., Shedlock v. Dep’t Of
Correction, 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1033 (Mass. 2004) (“The fact that Shedlock was not totally excluded
from his cell or from prison programs does not make it impossible for him to prove his claim
under the ADA, [Section 504], and art. 114. . .”). In Shedlock, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that it was overly narrow to require that “a violation could only be premised
on conduct that resulted in a complete exclusion from programs or total denial of benefits.” Id.
Similarly, the court held that, “[a]lthough art. 114 contains no definition of the term ‘qualified
handicapped individual,’ the language of the amendment closely tracks the language of the
[Rehabilitation Act].” Id. at 1031 (citing Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., 546 N.E.2d
166, 168 n.4 (Mass. 1989)).
240. Compare MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV (“No otherwise qualified handicapped
individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, denied
the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity within the
commonwealth.” (emphasis added)) with 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (stating that an individual with
disabilities cannot, “solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or . . . conducted by any Executive agency.” (emphasis
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It is possible that, under Article 114, a plaintiff is not required to prove
that the defendant subjectively intended to discriminate.241 There is
little case law arising under Article 114 and MERA § 103 outside the
employment setting, so it is unclear how a court would treat Article 114
and MERA claims against an SRO. But this also means that a court
could interpret the Massachusetts provisions—and especially Article
114—as imposing requirements above the floor required by the ADA
and Section 504 in the school context.
Massachusetts’s disability provisions do not significantly augment
the protections from federal law, but a plaintiff could use state law to
raise claims that mirror common federal claims. A plaintiff could claim
that the SRO, the school district, and the law enforcement agency failed
to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability in the use of force, failed to
adequately train SROs on interacting with students with disabilities,
and discriminated against disabled students in the methods of
administering the SRO program.242 As described in Section II.A.2, most
circuits require police to provide reasonable accommodations during
arrest absent exigent circumstances. In Wilson v. City of Southlake, for
example, the court found that the SRO was not exempt from
accommodating an eight-year-old in the course of arrest.243 In
determining that the circumstances were not so exigent as to make
accommodations unreasonable, the court considered: (1) the school
setting and the actions of bystanders, (2) the relative threat in light of
the child’s age, (3) the officer’s knowledge of the child’s disability, and
(4) the presence and type of weapon.244
The claim would likely need to be brought under MERA § 103, not
Article 114. Courts have held that Article 114 does not provide an
independent cause of action where a claim is available under an

added)).
241. Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 546 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Mass. 1989)
(stating in dicta that “[t]here is no requirement in art. 114 that a defendant be shown to have
subjectively intended to deny the constitutional rights of a handicapped individual”).
242. See generally Section II.A.2, supra, describing the federal disability law claims in
McCadden v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2019).
243. 936 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2019).
244. See id. at 331–32. In Wilson, a school staff member had instructed the officer to remain
where he was and not speak to the child while the staff member tried to diffuse the situation,
indicating a lack of exigence. The child’s age reflected that the relative threat was low, and the
officer knew of the child’s disability. The court concluded that the child did not have an actual
weapon capable of inflicting harm, stating that “[a] jump rope in the hands of an eight-year-old
child is not a weapon.” Id.
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existing statute such as MCRA245 or MERA.246 In Brodsky v. New
England School of Law, the District of Massachusetts held that an
expelled law student could not proceed directly against the law school
under Article 114 on allegations of disability discrimination.247 The
court explained that the constitutional claim was indistinguishable
from the claim brought under MERA § 103, and MERA provided a
“well-worn procedural path to relief.”248
There are at least two more potential obstacles to bringing a claim
under Art. 114 or MERA § 103. First, a government authority could
have qualified immunity, but in Shedlock v. Department of Corrections,
the court noted that the Department of Corrections did not argue that
it was immune from suit for violations of Article 114.249 Second, some
courts have interpreted Section 504 to require a different causation
standard than the ADA:250 Section 504 prohibits discrimination “solely
by reason of” disability,251 whereas the ADA does not require that the
discrimination is “solely” based on disability status.252 Other courts
245. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11I (West 2020); see, e.g., Kilburn v. Dep’t of Corr.
State Transp. Unit, No. 07-P-812, 2008 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 396 (App. Ct. July 25, 2008)
(“There is no individual right of action under art. 114 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
where, as here, a plaintiff may seek redress under an existing statute such as G.L. c. 12, § 11I, of
the State Civil Rights Act.”); Layne, 546 N.E.2d at 168 (“If a violation of art. 114 rights can be
redressed within the ambit of an existing statute, such as the State Civil Rights Act, there is a wellworn procedural path to relief for such a violation.”).
246. See, e.g., Marlon v. W. New Eng. Coll., No. CIV.A. 01-12199DPW, 2003 WL 22914304,
at *10 n.19 (D. Mass. Dec. 9, 2003), aff’d, 124 F. App’x 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that studentplaintiff could not “separately bring both an Article 114 claim and a § 103 claim” against the
college for failure to accommodate her disabilities); Brodsky v. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 617 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D. Mass. 2009) (same). The federal district court in Marlon explained of
Massachusetts’ state precedent: “The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that ‘[i]f
a violation of art. 114 rights can be redressed within the ambit of an existing statute, such as the
State Civil Rights Act, there is a well-worn procedural path to relief for such a violation.’” Marlon,
2003 WL 22914304 at *10 n.19 (first quoting Layne, 546 N.E.2d at 168; then citing Tate v. Dep’t
of Mental Health, 645 N.E.2d 1159 (Mass. 1995) (Article 114 claim barred because a claim under
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B provided adequate relief to redress handicap discrimination in
employment).
247. Brodsky, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
248. Id. at 6.
249. Shedlock v. Dep’t of Corr., 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1038 n.14 (Mass. 2004) (“While the
immunity theories might extend to the entirety of Shedlock’s ADA claims (a point we need not
decide), any such immunity would be of no practical consequence in light of Shedlock’s
companion claims under [Section 504] and art. 114. . . . [T]he department [has not] contended that
it is immune from suit for violations of art. 114.”).
250. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Southlake, 936 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up)
(“Under Section 504, the plaintiff must establish that disability discrimination was the sole reason
for the exclusion or denial of benefits. While under Title II of the ADA, ‘discrimination need not
be the sole reason.’”).
251. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
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have made no such distinction. For example, in Shedlock, the court
stated that, “[t]he ADA, the [Rehabilitation Act], and art. 114 all
prohibit the same conduct.”253 The court’s statement in Shedlock
suggests that Massachusetts courts may be hesitant to apply “solely” as
a more demanding standard.
IV. LOCKSTEPPING AND EVOLVING ADVOCACY, LITIGATION, AND
POLICY STRATEGIES

In the current landscape, plaintiffs face daunting odds if they look
to the courts for recourse for SRO misconduct, but litigation against
SROs has continued nonetheless.254 The trend can likely be attributed
to SROs’ “entrenched behavioral patterns.”255 Though some states have
implemented policies intended to restrict SRO conduct, it is not clear
that such policies offer more actionable protection than federal law.
Despite Massachusetts’s efforts—including the SRO Law and its MOU
requirement, and the Restraint Regulation and its associated training
recommendations—it is not clear there are remedies for
noncompliance. Similarly, even if state provisions like Article 14 of the
Massachusetts Constitution prove to be more protective than federal
law, qualified immunity and confused law stemming from SROs’
blurred roles may limit students’ recourse.
Thus, federal law and some state law appear to be insufficient to
deter inappropriate use of force by SROs. Absent meaningful remedies
and prevention, eliminating SROs from schools altogether seems like
the only option. This section will briefly consider future directions and
priorities for protecting students from SROs through litigation and
policy reform, and the potential for state and local governments to
break out of lockstep to adopt standards that are more protective than
federal law.
Many advocates are pushing for state and local policy reform to
eliminate SROs from schools altogether.256 Some are lobbying to

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”).
253. Shedlock, 818 N.E.2d at 1032.
254. Zirkel, supra note 11, at 323
255. Id. (“[T]he primary contributing factor [to unabated SRO litigation] appears to be the
seemingly entrenched behavioral pattern of the SROs reflected in these cases,” not an increase
in the number of SROs because the number of SROs has not significantly increased in recent
years).
256. Zoom Interview with Sabrina Bernadel, Attorney, Equal Justice Works Fellow, Nat’l
Women’s L. Ctr., (Dec. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Bernadel Interview] (interview notes on file with
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reallocate SRO funds in state and local budgets to school counseling
and mental health resources.257 Others are working to increase SRO
accountability by limiting the reach of qualified immunity as a
defense.258 And some organizations are strategizing to avoid “failure to
train” claims that ultimately require greater allocation of resources to
law enforcement, which would be counterproductive to the ultimate
goal of reducing the presence of SROs.259 Indeed, data shows that
providing additional resources and training to law enforcement has not
reduced negative interactions between law enforcement and either
people of color or disabled people.260
Because state and local governments have primary authority over
education, education funding,261 and law enforcement, it is both
possible and appropriate for them to break out of lockstep—especially

the Author). See, e.g., Perez Jr. & Erwin, supra note 141 (“In response to national protests against
racism and police brutality sparked by the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, several school
districts across the country have ended their relationships with local police departments.”).
257. See, e.g., Cheryl Corley, Do Police Officers in Schools Really Make Them Safer?, NPR
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591753884/do-police-officers-in-schools-reallymake-them-safer (“[Activists] with Voices of Youth in Chicago Education . . . are lobbying for
changes that would allow school districts to use some money designated for school resource
officers for school psychologists, social workers and other strategies.”).
258. See, e.g., Dorwart v. Caraway, P.3d 128, 140 (Mont. 2002) (rejecting qualified immunity
as a defense for state constitutional claims). See also Nick Sibilla, Colorado Passes Landmark Law
Against Qualified Immunity, Creates New Way to Protect Civil Rights, FORBES (Jun 21, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/06/21/colorado-passes-landmark-law-againstqualified-immunity-creates-new-way-to-protect-civil-rights/?sh=2982df23378a (describing a
movement to change immunity doctrines across the U.S., including Colorado enacting legislation
in June 2020 to eliminate qualified immunity for local law enforcement officers, sheriff’s deputies,
and Colorado State Patrol officers in actions under state law in state court).
259. Cf. Alex S. Vitale, The Answer to Police Violence Is Not ‘Reform’. It’s Defunding. Here’s
GUARDIAN
(May
31,
2020),
Why,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/31/the-answer-to-police-violence-is-notreform-its-defunding-heres-why (“The alternative is not more money for police training
programs, hardware or oversight. It is to dramatically shrink their function.”); Caroline Preston,
Police Education Is Broken. Can It Be Fixed?, HECHINGER REP. (June 28, 2020),
https://hechingerreport.org/police-education-is-broken-can-it-be-fixed/ (“You can have the best
training in the world but at the end of the day it comes down to morals, it comes down to the
culture of an organization, it comes down to what’s tolerated,” said Erik Misselt, the interim
executive director of the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training (cleaned up)).
260. See generally Martin Kaste, NYPD Study: Implicit Bias Training Changes Minds, Not
Necessarily Behavior, NPR (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/10/909380525/nypdstudy-implicit-bias-training-changes-minds-not-necessarily-behavior (describing a study with a
“null result” that “doesn’t prove implicit bias training changes cops’ behavior, but it doesn’t
disprove it either”).
261. To varying degrees over the years, schooling has primarily been the domain of states.
Wong, supra note 135 (“Schooling in America is not the domain of the federal government, but
rather the domain of states, all 50 of which mandate in their individual constitutions the provision
of public education.”); see also Zackin, supra note 129, at 67.
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in the absence of comprehensive federal action. Attorney Peggy
Nicholson’s experience in North Carolina need not be the norm: She
explained that “lax” state laws usually did not offer viable options for
claims related to use of force in schools by SROs or by other personnel,
leaving her to rely on federal law.262 Crystal Grant, an education law
attorney who practiced in Michigan, explained that she has had success
filing administrative complaints against congregate living centers based
on violations of the state’s policy prohibiting the use of restraints as
punishment.263 Grant would usually use the state’s administrative
complaint process or mediation because “going to court does not end
well.”264
Breaking out of lockstep could potentially be effective in a
litigation strategy that capitalizes on state public education provisions.
As described in Section II.B, many state constitutions guarantee a
“positive right” to a free, public education and impose equitable
funding and resource allocation obligations. Positive rights “require
government to do or provide something, while negative rights require
only that government refrain from doing something.”265 Suits alleging
violations of the positive right to education generally claim that a state
has failed to provide equal access to education or an education that
meets a qualitative minimum standard—both of which are obligations
under the state constitution.266
262. Zoom Interview with Crystal Grant and Peggy Nicholson, Attorneys, Duke University
School of Law Children’s Law Clinic (Dec. 16, 2020) (interview notes on file with the Author).
For clarity, Grant’s statements will be reference hereinafter as “Grant Interview,” and
Nicholson’s statements as “Nicholson Interview.” Grant is a Senior Lecturing Fellow & Interim
Director of the Children’s Law Clinic and was previously a clinical fellow in the Pediatric
Advocacy Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School and practiced education and disability
law in Michigan. Nicholson is a Lecturing Fellow & Supervising Attorney at the Children’s Law
Clinic and was previously the director of the Youth Justice Project of the Southern Coalition for
Social Justice and an education-law attorney at Legal Aid of North Carolina.
263. Grant Interview, supra note 262 (describing a general strategy not specific to SROs).
Congregate living centers can include group homes for disabled individuals and long-term care
facilities.
264. Id.
265. Zackin, supra note 129, at 27 (“Negative rights are the bases of demands for restraint by
the government, while positive rights are the bases of demands for intervention. . . . [I]t is useful
to think about the difference between a right to housing and a right to free speech. A right that
requires government to intervene by providing the homeless with shelter is a positive right, while
a right that requires government to refrain from silencing speech is a negative right.”).
266. See, e.g., Doe v. Sec’y of Educ., 95 N.E.3d 241, 252 (Mass. 2018) (denying a challenge to
the state’s caps on charter school enrollment by students arguing that they were denied a
constitutionally adequate education and dismissing the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim under
the state constitution, but noting that the state constitution’s education clause imposes “an
affirmative duty on the Commonwealth to provide . . . constitutionally ‘adequate’” education in
public schools).
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Such suits have not yet been used in the SRO context. Arguably,
“unreasonable, forceful, or life-threatening interactions with SROs”
may interfere with the fundamental right to education under the state
constitution because it deprives the child of valuable learning time and
inhibits positive development at school.267 A plaintiff would need to
show a connection between the allocation of resources and the failure
to provide an education that meets the state’s constitutional floor.268
Plaintiffs might demonstrate, for example, that SROs are not in fact
making schools and students safer and that resources are being
allocated to SROs and security personnel instead of to other critical
areas.269 Other critical areas where resources may be necessary for
students to achieve a qualitative minimum of education might include
funding for teachers, mental health personnel, or books or facilities.270
SROs impose severe costs for school districts and states, including for
funding of positions and the “fiscal and public relations costs of using .
. . districts’ limited education budgets to defend [SRO] court actions.”271
The fiscal costs are difficult to estimate, but in 2018, 26 states allocated
at least $960 million for school safety programs.272 One report found
that police officers “assigned to the Chicago Public Schools
accumulated over $2 million in misconduct settlements” from 2012267. See generally Sabrina Bernadel, Simply Put, Education is Different, Analyzing the Gary
B. v Whitmer Right to A Basic Minimum Education as a Constitutional Claim Against School
Resource Officers, at 43, (May 12, 2020) (working paper) (on file with the Author) (considering
“the viability of and strategies for bringing claims against states for violation of students’
constitutional right to a basic minimum education to limit, if not eliminate, the presence of
SROs”).
268. Right to education claims are focused on the allocation of resources. Zackin, supra note
129, and Sutton, supra note 122, provide thorough accounts of the evolution of right to education
claims. Many state constitutional provisions arose out of severe inequities in education funding,
and activists pushing for reform used litigation to advance a movement for education equity. See
supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text (describing right to education claims). In connecting
SRO presence to state education resources, advocates would need to examine the types of data
that courts in that jurisdiction consider. See, e.g., M. Patrick Moore Jr., The Constitutional Right
to Education in the Commonwealth, 101 MASS. L. REV. 19, 27 (2020) (“Following Doe, students
from a diverse and economically disadvantaged district may use the state’s own data to allege that
the education they are being provided is inadequate.”).
269. Bernadel Interview, supra note 256.
270. Id.
271. Zirkel, supra note 11, at 326. “For the public relations cost, consider the impact of media
reports of SROs ‘body slamming a 12-year-old girl,’ carrying ‘powerful rifles,’ ‘handcuffing a
crying 7-year-old,’ ‘repeatedly pinn[ing] to ground, [and] handcuff[ing]’ a 10-year-old boy with
autism, and arresting students for ‘such minor infractions as . . . trying to get to the bathroom.’”
Id. at 326–27 (quoting various news articles) (citations omitted). “[G]iven the budgetary
constraints of school districts and other SRO employers, the priority in resource allocation must
extend beyond the prevailing prescription for training.” Id. at 331.
272. Phenicie, supra note 26 (“Colorado lawmakers, for instance, poured $35 million into
school resource officers and security upgrades.”).
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2016.273
But litigation is not currently the primary focus for at least some
advocacy organizations. T.W., a former attorney who worked on issues
related to the school-to-prison pipeline at a national litigation and
advocacy non-profit organization, explained that advocates have
thought about new and different claims to bring, but ultimately, the
larger focus has shifted to policy-based arguments.274 He explained that
“everybody wants to litigate, but it just isn’t feasible because the case
law is so bad.”275 Without broader change, T.W. explained, students
obtain relief from abusive SRO conduct only when there is attention
from the media and shocking videos—not from the range of cumulative
harm that happens off-camera.276 The status quo is the systematic
criminalization of the innocuous behavior of older students—
especially students of color—which does not usually make the news or
get addressed in court.277
Training for SROs278 and clarifying and limiting SROs’ roles
through the use of MOUs are frequently recommended areas for
reform and are recurring issues in SRO-related litigation.279 But some
advocates are changing tack: Particularly in the wake of nationwide
racial justice protests in 2020, many advocacy organizations are
reevaluating how best to address these issues.280 Some advocates are
273. Michelle Mbekeani-Wiley, Handcuffs in Hallways: The State of Policing in Chicago
Public Schools, SHRIVER CTR. ON POVERTY L. at 4, (Feb. 1, 2017)
https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/handcuffs-in-hallways-amendedrev1.pdf (updated in part June 30, 2020).
274. Zoom Interview with T.W., former attorney at a national litigation and advocacy nonprofit organization, (Dec. 15, 2020) [hereinafter T.W. Interview] (interview notes on file with the
Author).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Grant described one of her cases where a student was tased by an SRO, and the SRO
was unfamiliar with Behavioral Intervention Plans (BIPs), which are positive behavioral supports
for disabled students that the school district must consider under the IDEA. Implementing a BIP
is best practice to regulate responses to undesirable disability-related behaviors. Grant negotiated
a settlement that required that SROs be included in trainings about interacting with disabled
students. Grant Interview, supra note 262.
279. See, e.g., Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 282 (“These cases reveal the need for a
comprehensive training program for SROs, clear delineation of the scope of-and limitations onthe SROs’ duties, and strict adherence by both school personnel and the SROs to their respective
roles.”); OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 33, at 1 (requiring MOUs
that “clearly define[] the roles and responsibilities of the individual partners involved”).
280. Bernadel Interview, supra note 256. For example, on June 30, 2020, the Shriver Center
on Poverty Law published a cover letter on its February 2017 report on police in schools, stating,
“While we know that many groups have relied on the data in our report to make the case for
#policefreeschools we also know that the data and our recommendations resulted in solutions,
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finding that requiring MOUs between law enforcement and schools
and requiring better training for SROs have not had as much positive
impact as hoped: Students are still experiencing broad, negative effects
from SRO presence in schools.281 T.W. criticized the effectiveness of
relying on MOUs and merely categorizing SROs as school personnel
to limit SRO misconduct.282 The former, he explained, are mere nonbinding policy documents and consequently do not provide a right of
action. The latter will usually not matter much because SROs still have
police power from the state “at the end of the day” and courts are
unlikely to use the more restrictive standards that apply to school
personnel.283
State and local independence are also essential to achieving current
policy aims. Many activists and advocacy organizations are working to
shift resources from programs that “invest in criminalization” to
programs that improve school climates and student well-being.284 In
Chicago, for example, “students, the city’s teachers union and
community groups are now circulating a petition and calling for the $33
million the school system spends placing police in schools to be used
instead to hire additional nurses and counselors.”285 Local legislative
and budgetary control are essential to building on local activism and
community support.286 Grant and T.W. emphasized the importance of
using narratives—which must include the voices of students with
disabilities287—to shift public attitudes and build community support.288
Achieving narrative shifts is a marathon and takes time, but it is
important to be ready for impactful “advocacy windows” that will arise
during the marathon.289 In addition, Nicholson explained that broader
change to address the presence of law enforcement in schools requires
the use of cross-cutting strategies that take advantage of the combined

which we advocated for, that historically have not always produced desirable outcomes. Going
forward, we are committed to always listening to the voices of people directly impacted by laws
and policies.” See Mbekeani-Wiley, supra note 273.
281. Bernadel Interview, supra note 256.
282. T.W. Interview, supra note 274.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Lauren Camera, The End of Police in Schools, U.S. NEWS (June 12, 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2020-06-12/schools-districts-end-contractswith-police-amid-ongoing-protests.
286. T.W. Interview, supra note 274.
287. Grant Interview, supra note 262.
288. T.W. Interview, supra note 274.
289. Zoom Interview with S.S., policy analyst at a regional litigation and advocacy non-profit
organization, (Dec. 15, 2020) (interview notes on file with the Author).
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expertise of education law practitioners (who usually bring suits against
schools) and civil rights practitioners (who usually bring suits against
law enforcement).290
SROs impose great individual and societal costs,291 and there is a
paucity of evidence that SROs are effective in preventing mass
shootings or provide other significant benefits. “Established to prevent
violence, primarily from outside the school, SROs have produced
violence inside the schools.”292 The presence of SROs results in students
achieving less and experiencing more physical and emotional harm,
with long-term implications for individuals and communities.293
CONCLUSION
With more emphasis by many advocates on state and local solutions
to the problems associated with SROs, future litigation will likely
involve more claims related to state and local laws. Arguments around
the benefits of breaking out of lockstep can be raised in support of
“liberal” or “conservative” policies, as Judge Sutton points out.294 In any
event, advocates, state and local legislators, and courts should avoid
reflexive lockstepping and take advantage of the broader latitude
offered by state constitutions and state and local law to address the
quintessentially local issues of education and law enforcement.
Increasing recognition of the harms that stem from having SROs in
schools and invigorated movements to shift resources from SROs to
other resources provide an opportunity for state and local legislators to
promote school safety in ways that are more protective of all students.
Advocates, including those who generally litigate exclusively in federal
290. Nicholson Interview, supra note 262. Nicholson explained that the best options in her
practice were usually to file a grievance at the school level or a complaint with the U.S.
Department of Education, or to raise issues through the processes outlined in the IDEA based
on a denial of FAPE.
291. Weisburst describes a conservative estimate of the aggregate policy cost that results
from the impact of SROs on educational attainment generally, and on graduation rates
specifically. Weisburst, supra note 3, at 362. “The resulting loss in earnings is $105 million dollars
for affected students, leading to an aggregate policy cost of $162 million including the value of
grant transfers. This calculation is illustrative: It does not include emotional or psychological costs
of school discipline, the value of increased safety or perceptions of safety, benefits for subgroups
of students who may be positively affected, costs of more than a single year decrease in schooling,
or costs related to reductions in college enrollment. Despite these limitations, this exercise
highlights the fact that the results in this study raise serious questions about the value of future
investments in school police.”
292. Zirkel, supra note 11, at 332.
293. See Section I.B, supra.
294. See Sutton, supra note 122, at 176–77 (“[S]tate constitutions provid[ing] a second avenue
for invalidating a local law says nothing about what kind of law should be, or will be, challenged.”).
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courts, must be prepared to make the case for broader protections in
state courts.

